Space Strategy in the 21st Century

Transcription

1 Space Strategy in the 21st Century This book offers an overview of space strategy in the 21st century. The purpose of space strategy is to coordinate, integrate, and prioritize space activities across security, commercial, and civil sectors. Without strategy, space activities continue to provide value, but it becomes difficult to identify and execute long-term programs and projects and to optimize the use of space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. Strategy is essential for all these ends since dependence on, and use of, space is accelerating globally and space is integrated in the fabric of activities across all sectors and uses. This volume identifies a number of areas of concern pertinent to the development of national space strategy, including: intellectual foundations; political challenges; international cooperation and space governance; space assurance and political, organizational, and management aspects specific to security space strategy. The contributing authors expand their focus beyond that of the United States, and explore and analyze the international developments and implications of national space strategies of Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Israel, and Brazil. This book will be of much interest to students of space power and politics, strategic studies, foreign policy, and International Relations in general. Eligar Sadeh is President of Astroconsulting International and a Research Professor with the Center for Space Studies at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs.

2 Series: Space Power and Politics Series Editors: Everett C. Dolman and John Sheldon School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, USAF Air, Maxwell, USA Space Warfare Strategy, principles and policy John J. Klein US Hypersonic Research and Development The rise and fall of Dyna-Soar, Roy F. Houchin II Chinese Space Policy A study in domestic and international politics Roger Handberg and Zhen Li The International Politics of Space Michael Sheehan Space and Defense Policy Edited by Damon Coletta and Frances T. Pilch Space Policy in Developing Countries The search for security and development on the final frontier Robert C. Harding Space Strategy in the 21st Century Theory and policy Edited by Eligar Sadeh

3 Space Strategy in the 21st Century Theory and policy Edited by Eligar Sadeh

4 First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business 2013 selection and editorial matter, Eligar Sadeh; individual chapters, the contributors The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Space strategy in the 21st century : theory and policy / edited by Eligar Sadeh. p. cm. (Space power and politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Astronautics and state. 2. Astronautics and state United States. 3. Space security. I. Sadeh, Eligar. TL790.S dc ISBN: (hbk) ISBN: (ebk) Typeset in Baskerville by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

5 Contents List of illustrations List of contributors Acknowledgments vii viii x Introduction: towards space strategy 1 E L I g A R S A D E h 1 Space and strategy: from theory to policy 15 J A M E S C L A Y M O L T z 2 Political challenges of space strategy 39 R O B I E I. S A M A N T A R O Y 3 International cooperation and space governance strategy 52 N A N C Y g A L L A g h E R 4 Strategy for space assurance 77 J A M E S D. R E N D L E M A N 5 Strategy and the security space enterprise 120 D A v I D C h R I S T O P h E R A R N O L D A N D P E T E R L. h A Y S 6 Space strategy and strategic management 159 K U R T A. h E P P A R D A N D S T E v E g. g R E E N 7 Space economics and commerce in a strategic context 179 A N D R E W J. A L D R I N 8 Space launch capabilities and strategic considerations 201 J E F F F O U S T

6 vi Contents 9 Earth observations and space strategy 221 M O L L Y K. M A C A U L E Y 10 Policy and strategic considerations of the Russian space program 237 v I C T O R z A B O R S K I Y 11 China s space strategy and policy evolution 249 R O g E R h A N D B E R g 12 European experiences with space policies and strategies 263 C h R I S T O P h E v E N E T A N D K A I - U W E S C h R O g L 13 Japan s space strategy: diplomatic and security challenges 278 h I R O T A K A W A T A N A B E 14 Space policy and strategy of India 303 g. S. S A C h D E v A 15 Israel s space strategy 322 D E g A N I T P A I K O W S K Y, R A M L E v I, A N D I S A A C B E N I S R A E L 16 Planning and strategic orientations of the Brazilian space program 335 O T A v I O D U R ã O Index 347

7 Illustrations Figures 7.1 Aerospace industry return on sales in the United States Sales of space propulsion in the United States Sales of space vehicle systems in the United States National positioning for defense industrial policy 193 Tables 7.1 Industrial policy models Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats analysis of the U.S. aerospace industry 191

8 Contributors Eligar Sadeh, Ph.D., is Principal Investigator of the Space Strategy Project that led to this volume, where he serves as the Editor. Sadeh is President of Astroconsulting International; Research Professor with the University of Colorado, and Adjunct Professor with the International Space University, as well as Editor for the academic journal Astropolitics. Andrew J. Aldrin, Ph.D., is the Director of Business Development and Advanced Programs for United Launch Alliance. David Christopher Arnold is a Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. he serves as Chief of the Program Assessment Division for the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space, and Editor of the journal Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly. Isaac Ben Israel (ret. Major-general, Israeli Air Force), Ph.D., is the chairman of the Israeli Space Agency and a Professor at Tel-Aviv University. he served as an Israeli Parliament Member. Otavio Durão, Ph.D., serves as Deputy Planning Coordinator and Local Coordinator for Nanosat/Cubesat Projects at the headquarters of the National Institute for Space Research (INPE) of Brazil. Jeff Foust, Ph.D., is a senior analyst and project manager with the Futron Corporation. Nancy Gallagher, Ph.D., is the Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Security Studies and a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland s School of Public Policy. Steve G. Green, D.B.A., is a Professor of Management at United States Air Force Academy. Roger Handberg, Ph.D., is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida. Peter L. Hays, Ph.D., supports the U.S. Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space and the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense

9 Contributors ix Studies at the U.S. Air Force Academy, and teaches at george Washington University. Kurt A. Heppard, Ph.D., is a Professor of Management at United States Air Force Academy. Ram Levi (ret. Israeli Air Force) is a Research Fellow at the Yuval Ne eman Workshop for Science, Technology, and Security, Tel-Aviv University, and cybersecurity adviser for the Israeli National Council for Research and Development. Molly K. Macauley, Ph.D., is vice President for Research and Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future. James Clay Moltz, Ph.D., is a Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he also holds a joint appointment in the Space Systems Academic group. Deganit Paikowsky, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at the Yuval Ne eman Workshop for Science Technology and Security at Tel-Aviv University, and a space consultant and committee coordinator at Israel s National Council for Research and Development. James D. Rendleman, (ret. Colonel, U.S. Air Force), JD and LLM, practices space law as Chief, Operations Law for the Joint Functional Component Command for Space, United States Strategic Command. G.S. Sachdeva, (ret. Wing Commander, Indian Air Force) Ph.D., is Adjunct Professor in Air and Space Law at the Center for International Legal Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and Center of Air and Space Law, NALSAR University of Law, hyderabad. Robie I. Samanta Roy, Ph.D., is a professional staff member on the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee and served as the Assistant Director for Space and Aeronautics at the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Ph.D., is the Director of the European Space Policy Institute. Christophe Venet, Ph.D. candidate, is a Research Associate with the Institut français des relations internationales. Hirotaka Watanabe is a Specially Appointed Researcher at the graduate School of Law and Politics, and a visiting Scholar at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Japan. Victor Zaborskiy, Ph.D., is an independent export control consultant doing business as Special Trade Operations Consulting.

10 Acknowledgments The genesis of this book began in 2009 with a Space Strategy Project. The challenge of the project was to identify and assess the intellectual foundations for developing national space strategy. With this challenge in mind, Astroconsulting International with support of the Secure World Foundation, and in collaboration with the Space Policy Institute at george Washington University and the National Space Studies Center of the Air University implemented the project. Implementation included bringing the right mix and quality of expertise to bear on the issues of space strategy, and applying research to the requirements of identifying and assessing the intellectual foundations related to space strategy development. The first part of the project entailed a workshop among the experts that led to a special issue publication on national space strategy in the scholarly journal Astropolitics 8:2/3 (2010). The publication of this volume represents the final intellectual effort of the project. Foremost, I would like to thank the Secure World Foundation for their support of this project and volume through a research grant. I would like to thank as well the contributing researchers and authors. The expertise and insights regarding space strategy provided by the contributing experts are reflected here in the pages of this volume. Contributors include: James Clay Moltz, Robie I. Samanta Roy, Nancy gallagher, James D. Rendleman, David Christopher Arnold, Peter L. hays, Kurt A. heppard, Steve g. green, Andrew J. Aldrin, Jeff Foust, Molly K. Macauley, victor zaborskiy, Roger handberg, Christophe venet, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, hirotaka Watanabe, g.s. Sachdeva, Deganit Paikowsky, Ram Levi, Isaac Ben Israel, and Otavio Durão. The intellectual support of the following is also appreciated: Brian Weeden, victoria Samson, Ray Williamson, and Michael Simpson of the Secure World Foundation; Scott Pace of the Space Policy Institute at george Washington University; and John Sheldon of the National Space Studies Center of Air University. Eligar Sadeh Principal Investigator and Editor

11 Introduction Towards space strategy Eligar Sadeh Strategy links power to purpose, serves and fulfills policy, and provides a means for maintaining advantages for states. 1 Fundamentally, strategy results from identifying goals and objectives in policy, developing ways and means to achieve these ends, and allocating resources to implement plans to achieve them. 2 In this context, intellectual foundations, concepts, and topics for national space strategy to be developed, with a particular focus on the United States but including other important spacefaring states, are discussed in this volume. The purpose of space strategy is to coordinate, integrate, and prioritize space activities across security, commercial, and civil sectors. Without strategy, space activities continue to provide value, but it becomes difficult to identify and execute long-term programs and projects and to optimize the use of space for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. Strategy is essential for all these ends, and all the more so, since dependence on, and use of, space is accelerating globally and space is integrated in the fabric of activities across all sectors and uses. A number of areas of concern pertinent to the development of national space strategy are identified in this volume: intellectual foundations; political challenges; international cooperation and space governance; space assurance and political, organizational, and management aspects specific to security space strategy; strategic management; strategic context of space economics and commerce including industrial base issues; strategic considerations regarding space launch; the role of Earth observations in strategic formulations; and international developments and implications of national space strategies and policies among spacefaring states other than the United States and encompassing Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Israel, and Brazil. 3 The intellectual basis of the analysis in this volume is based on a number of assumptions. Space strategy can either be formulated as a comprehensive, grand strategy or as a more limited strategy covering specific areas of concern and common problems that crosscut the different space

12 2 E. Sadeh sectors. Both of these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages, and in either case, strategy provides guidance, and national governments can use strategy to evaluate and hold accountable the various departments, agencies, and organizations that implement space programs and projects. Spacefaring states do not suffer from a lack of space policy. Yet, they do suffer from a lack of explicit space strategies, which can provide a roadmap for connecting ways and means to achieve ends established by space policy. The development of space strategy must advance on the basis that resource constraints given that program and project demands are greater than the available resources are more the norm than the exception. Within this context, space strategy needs to account for how best to deal with gaps between policies, programs, projects, and budgets. For space strategy to be formulated and effective, it must serve as a guide to allow for decisions on requirements, budgets, and operations, and for trade-offs in the planning of space activities that are necessary given resource constraints. Strategy must address the fact that the traditional boundaries between the different space sectors security, commercial, and civil are no longer applicable for many space activities that crosscut these sectors. Thus, strategy must consider the common issues and concerns that can provide for unity of effort among the space sectors. At issue for greater cooperation and unity of effort among the space sectors, is to identify and emphasize the mutual and common benefits that each sector can derive from space and to work to lessen the barriers between the sectors that disrupt such cooperation. A whole-o f-government approach is critical for space strategy. In addition to a focus on development of projects, and the requisite technology, capabilities, and operations, the whole-of-government approach addresses the broader context of security, commercial, and civil space sectors, and considers political and diplomatic, bureaucratic and regulatory, managerial, and legislative factors. Space developers and users worldwide share a set of basic strategic goals that serve as a common and shared basis for space strategy. These goals include: to secure the space domain for everyone s peaceful use; to protect legitimate space assets from the various types of threats; and to derive value from space assets for security, economic, civil, and environmental ends. It is also important to avoid common pitfalls in the process of developing strategy. Pitfalls identified herein include the following: over-r eaching with strategy formulation and underperforming with implementation;

13 Introduction 3 failing to assume a whole-of-government approach, and instead, fixate on governance, implementation, and optimization issues; mistaking goals, policies, and program and project planning for strategy; failing to recognize and take seriously scarcity of resources; choosing poor or unattainable strategic goals and objectives; failing to recognize strategic problems and to define the strategic environment competitively; making false presumptions about one s own competence, or the likely causal linkages between one s strategy and one s goals and objectives; trying to satisfy too many different stakeholders and demands, as well as bureaucratic and programmatic processes, rather than focusing on strategy; failing to understand and deter threats and adversaries; determining one s areas of comparative advantage relative to the competition inaccurately; failing to realize that few individuals possess the cognitive skills and mindset to be competent strategists that are essential for strategy formulation and implementation. Intellectual foundations The first chapter, Space and strategy: from theory to policy, authored by James Clay Moltz, discusses definitions of strategy and how strategy applies to space activities. The question of what is strategy is difficult to answer. National Space Policy, for example, is something that every American administration since Eisenhower has formulated, but the notion that policy serves as strategy is incorrect. Further, a strategy is not an easy task as it must focus on the entire range of space activities, and as such, serve broader and more diverse interests than policy. And, strategy does not necessarily solve problems related to the uses of space, especially strategy that cannot be accomplished politically within a reasonable timeframe. The issue of how to create effective strategy is addressed by Moltz. There are a number of factors: develop consensus around a common theme; account for the reactions of spacefaring actors and states; mitigate resource constraints by prioritizing space at the national level and by stimulating private sector development; and provide for sustainable uses of space and effective space governance of common problems, such as orbital debris, and spectrum and orbital slot allocations. To further complicate matters, consensus that strategy is necessary is not sufficient for formulation and implementation, as there is also the need for political will and a process for strategic thinking. Political will is essential to define strategy, which is ultimately about what you want to do and how you want to do it the policy and political interests that you want to serve and fulfill. A process for strategic thinking can break down stove

14 4 E. Sadeh pipes and make interests more transparent among constituents and organizations. Strategy is a way of thinking, representing a common language and framework for space activities. This requires as well the need to develop competent strategists. Moltz concludes that one viable way forward is to formulate strategy based on cooperative approaches among spacefaring states to address problems concerning the sustainable uses of space: understanding and acting upon our common interests as human beings in space may be the most difficult, and most important, element of any future attempt at space strategy. Chapters 3 and 4 that follow later in this volume, which discuss international cooperation, space governance, and space assurance, provide further elaboration on common and cooperative strategies that can develop among spacefaring states in the civil and security realms of space. First, though, is an assessment of political challenges. Political challenges Robie Samanta Roy s chapter on Political challenges of space strategy makes the case that political challenges in developing strategy make a more focused, limited approach to that end more plausible. Such an approach can focus on common problems facing security, commercial, and civil space. Other chapters in this book examine many of these common problems, including governance (Chapter 3), commerce (Chapter 7), space launch (Chapter 8), and Earth observations (Chapter 9). At the same time, a more narrowly focused strategy on specific issues, while more achievable in the political environment that exists, posits the danger, nonetheless, of continuing to stove pipe programs and projects that is recognized as a serious problem in the space arena. Further, the nature of politics tends to drive strategies to be reactive and not proactive; strategies are adopted for the short term, rather than for the long term that is required to fulfill strategic interests. Given the reactive nature of the political system, sector-specific and issue-specific issues, such as access to space, remote sensing, and space infrastructure development, better suit the foci of strategy. It is also vital to focus on processes of formulating and implementing strategy, and the attendant policy-making, planning, and budgeting factors. Prioritization and trade-offs, given resource constraints, are essential to successful formulation and implementation, especially in light of entrenched interests among agencies and bureaucracies that are tasked with realizing programs and projects. Additionally, without top-level commitment and direction, and common interests that crosscut the implementing agencies and the space sectors, annual budget battles will tend to dominate implementation of any strategy. A strategic framework is essential to guide top-level decision-makers, and to maximize mutual benefit to agencies and stakeholders in the space arena so that their interests are to work together.

15 International cooperation and space governance Introduction 5 In Chapter 3, International cooperation and space governance strategy, Nancy Gallagher argues that the use of space is marked by interdependence with strong incentives for both cooperation and competition, and thus, the development of space strategy is not an independent choice, but an interdependent one. As such, key issues concern the best ways to conceptualize when, why, and how space strategy should include international cooperation. The concepts of space as a global commons and shared strategic objectives are put forward and discussed in this regard. Management of space as a global commons is rooted on the minimal forms of cooperation that exist today. However, this alone does not provide adequate incentives to forgo short-term national gains in return for long-term collective benefits. 4 The norm today of voluntary actions and mutual self-restraint to protect the space environment is hard to sustain in the context of competitive security relationships among major spacefaring states, and the increasing number and variety of space actors worldwide. The most plausible approach for management is one based on governance without government different kinds of arrangements for organizing states and other international actors so that they can solve shared problems and achieve collective goals in the absence of political authority. Cooperation on the basis of shared strategic objectives is one way to maximize security, commercial, civil, and environmental benefits that can be gained from space. Incentives for this kind of space cooperation are stronger if it includes approaches to space cooperation that serve fundamental strategic ends for spacefaring states. A national space strategy should explain, Gallagher argues, that the central problem for the United States, to illustrate, lies in providing and receiving credible strategic assurance. Chapter 4, which follows next, addresses the issue of space assurance in the context of security space. With an assurance-based strategy, a strong basis for cooperation can be realized as both legal approaches to cooperation based on the Outer Space Treaty Regime, which has broad and universal adherence, and voluntary actions and mutual self-restraint approaches to cooperation focused on responsible space behavior and sustainable uses of space can be accommodated. 5 Space assurance As noted earlier, spacefaring states are increasingly dependent on the use of space assets. Concomitantly, space assets are vulnerable to interference and disruption, either due to natural hazards of the space environment or due to deliberate efforts, like electronic interference and anti-satellite weapons. Given these vulnerabilities, strategy helps to address protection of space assets and to deter others from interfering with space assets. This

16 6 E. Sadeh is the focus of the analysis in Chapter 4, Strategy for space assurance, authored by James D. Rendleman. The specter of interference and disruption of space assets serve as catalysts for reappraising political, diplomatic, economic, and technical means to protect against and deter threats to these assets. Specific to the case of the United States, Rendleman argues that protection and deterrence strategy is incomplete for a number of reasons. One, going first with attack, implying deterrence failure, is always plausible in times of conflict. Two, by calling space systems vital as a matter of space policy, the United States issues a deterrent threat, but highlights the value of space assets as a target. Three, there are some actors that cannot be deterred. Four, actors can be poor stewards of space and engage in irresponsible actions on orbit. Last, there are space environmental threats, like space debris and space weather, which clearly cannot be deterred (only mitigated and protected from). Given these reasons, space assurance, not protection and deterrence, is the strategic goal. A space assurance strategy is a strategy to assure access to space capabilities on a sustainable basis; assurance incorporates deterrence, protection, and space governance to enable sustainable uses of space. Security space Chapter 5, Strategy and the security space enterprise, authored by David Christopher Arnold and Peter L. Hays, addresses the challenge of advancing a unified strategy in the case of the security space sector of the United States. To this end, there is no single organization with security space as its job; the Department of Defense (DOD), for example, does not have a unifying vision or mission statement for space activities. As a consequence, Arnold and Hays make the case that the essential ingredients for unifying security space lie with better organization and management based on dedicated and integrated offices within the Office of the President, DOD, and the intelligence community. The focus of the next chapter strategic management of space programs that is capabilities enabled advances the end of a more unified vision and strategy for security space as well. Strategic management Kurt A. Heppard and Steve G. Green, in Chapter 6 on Space strategy and strategic management, adopt a strategic management approach to the development of space strategy. Within the context of program and project management, Heppard and Green make the case that strategic management approaches should inform space strategy. One key function is to optimize the use of resources to achieve organizational goals and outcomes; the call to optimize space assets for national interests is a call for the strategic management of space-related resources and capabilities.

17 Introduction 7 Specifically, if a national space strategy is capabilities based, it will remain focused on building and executing space capabilities that support national priorities. An additional strategic issue for program and project management, and for space capabilities, concerns the role of government in stimulating, developing, and using space capabilities in pursuit of national interests, and in fostering international and commercial space efforts to achieve the broader potentials of space. Strategy needs to address ways to use space agencies and institutions, programs, investments, coordinating actions, regulatory, and other tools to perform these roles. Deciding on what space capabilities to develop and use involves complex decision-making processes. Once the government decides what it wants to pursue, the actual development, production, and delivery of new capabilities is fraught with technical, industrial base, management, funding, oversight, bureaucratic, and political challenges. The specific challenges concerning economics of space, commercial space activities, and industrial base issues are discussed in the next chapter on space economics and commerce. Space economics and commerce Economics and commerce influence the development of space strategy. This is examined in Chapter 7, Space economics and commerce in a strategic context, authored by Andrew J. Aldrin. Both opportunity cost and comparative advantage drive political and strategic decisions in space. Other related issues of importance include: the role of government in advancing space commerce; the role of economics as a driver for innovation and development in the space sectors; the role space plays in national and global economies; and the nature of global space business and commerce, and how this relates to strategic space advantages and wealth creation for spacefaring states. 6 An important strategic question to address for space economics and commerce is to what degree national governments enable or constrain the development of the space industrial base that provides the means for conducting space activities. Aldrin identifies four basic government market models for industrial policy in this regard: invisible hand where market forces predominate and there are many providers and buyers; national competition where the government dominates and essentially serves as the space industrial base through competitive government contracting; national champion where there is a single dedicated supplier and provider, an attractive option for emergent space powers; and arsenal with the government as the only customer and public private models of direct government ownership of commercial space enterprises. Aldrin assesses strengths and weaknesses of the space industrial base in the United States. Current strengths include skilled engineers, healthy prime contractors, innovative experimentation in various aspects of the

18 8 E. Sadeh market, and benefits from being the ostensible leader in space. How all these strengths can be nurtured and exploited abroad, in service of national interest, are important strategic concerns. On the other hand, the industrial base is challenged by weak human capital, weak supplier base, and declines in national budgets for space programs. Without a coherent national strategy to which the industrial base can devote itself, justifying fiscal outlays on its behalf becomes less plausible. 7 Strategic thinking and development can help to identify commercial opportunities, or even civil opportunities supported by industry, that further both national security and commercial goals. Space launch capabilities, the topic of the next chapter, are situated within this context global space commerce, government support and subsides of commercial launch, and strategic intent to ensure that space launch capabilities meet security space and commercial space goals. Space launch capabilities Space launch capabilities are foundational for achieving strategic ends; launching spacecraft into orbit is a key element of any national space strategy. The analysis offered in Chapter 8, Space launch capabilities and strategic considerations, by Jeff Foust, examines cost, reliability, and performance factors in relation to space strategy concerning space launch. A review of security, commercial, and civil space launch customers shows that for the majority of them cost is a lower priority than optimizing for launch reliability and launch performance, which includes safety and schedule assurance. Only for two emerging customer segments, operationally responsive space and entrepreneurial space ventures, is cost a key factor. Hence, existing launch systems actually meet most customers needs, creating equilibrium in the marketplace of space launch. Several scenarios, though, can disrupt the existing equilibrium and prioritize cost issues: the development of reusable suborbital and orbital vehicles; a shift to commercial providers for cargo and crew transportation to low Earth orbit (LEO); a growing use of small satellites in lieu of large-scale systems; and space program developments, including space launch and small satellites, in moderate space powers, such as in the examples of Israel and Brazil discussed in this volume. Earth observations Earth observations are primarily driven by scientific interests, and by the systems and technologies that are developed. Thinking of Earth observations more strategically requires a long-term view to set the agenda and priorities, and to make sure bureaucracies and agencies implement from that agenda. 8 This will require changes in approaches to Earth observations as to funding, organization, implementation, and data use. Chapter

19 Introduction 9 9, Earth observations and space strategy, by Molly K. Macauley, probes the management of Earth observations data as strategic information how to collect, analyze, and disseminate data, and whether and how much to cooperate internationally. There are a number of questions that strategy needs to address here: the question of who is authoritative; the question of value; and the question of international cooperation. On the question of who is authoritative, it is important to note possible areas of discrepancies. There are discrepancies in data collection and distribution, interpretation of data, and in ground-truthing data, where states tend to self-report. With the question of value, it is important to assess the social and economic benefits of Earth observations, like in areas of natural disaster mitigation and climate change. Additionally, Earth observation systems are expensive, and there is the issue of charging for information about natural resources when data policies treat information as a public good. In relation to the question of international cooperation, there are a number of issues that can work against the end of data as a public good. As a scientific discipline, there is pressure to publish first, and to allow for the information that is gathered to be reserved for a period of time for the use and assessment by the principal scientists and investigators. Also, there are key differences between science collaboration, which is more common, and sharing of information about valued natural resources that are under sovereign control of states. Data access can also be limited as a result of fees for data. Nevertheless, there is great deal of cooperation worldwide with Earth observations. There is the Group on Earth Observation as an outcome of the G8. Related to this cooperation is the concept of a Global Earth Observation System-of-Systems. And, Earth observations are essential to the work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Space strategies in spacefaring states Chapters 10 to 16 address national space programs in Russia, China, Europe, Japan, India, Israel, and Brazil. In these chapters, strategic intent and orientation from how these states plan and conduct space activities is assessed. 9 Russia and China both view space in similar strategic ways to the United States as a matter of international prestige and power where the key strategic intent is to develop across-the-board space capabilities and to maintain or achieve a leadership role in the space arena, including human spaceflight programs. 10 Russia is concentrated on developing a revamped space program since the end of the Soviet Union, and has not put forward an explicit space strategy. The lack of strategic guidance in Russia is evident with inadequate program prioritization and funding. These two factors have led to schedule delays, indefinite postponement, and outright cancellation of a number of national space programs and projects. 11 For

20 10 E. Sadeh China, the primary areas of focus have been to achieve indigenous and independent capabilities in civil, commercial, and military space pursuits, and, more recently, international space cooperation. Strategies for specific areas are evident in China, but institutional factors, such as the close and overlapping military civil space relations and institutions within the Chinese government, restrict both the prospects of a more grand strategy and of broadening international space cooperation. 12 In the case of Europe, there is a great deal of development at the level of space policy, but not strategy. Space policies are present at the European level with both the European Union and the European Space Agency. Japan, more than other developed national space programs, has advanced an explicit space strategy. A Basic Law for Space Activities and a Basic Plan for Space Activities were established since The plan is supported by a minister and strategic headquarters for space activities, and the Japanese government approved a law in 2012 to establish a space strategy office at the cabinet level. The Japanese case illustrates a common and crucial theme throughout this volume that the bureaucratic discipline to implement strategy and policy must come from top-level decision-makers. India, alternatively, developed its national space program more on an ad-hoc basis. Even though India established a national space program and the Indian Space Research Organization in 1969, there is no space policy, doctrine, strategy, or white papers on the subject. This leads India to put forward programs with specific short-term goals and motivations. 13 Nonetheless, India established a government-level Department of Space to execute space policy, and it has successfully developed and utilized space technology in the service of social development of the country. Strategies in the case of Israel and Brazil are a reflection of specific programs and projects in those medium power spacefaring states. Israel s national space program is largely influenced by a pragmatic approach directed at developing indigenous space capabilities for national security purposes. This encompasses reconnaissance, remote sensing, and telecommunications to support early warning, intelligence, and deterrence. It is only very recently that Israel added to this by developing shared strategic interests with other spacefaring states in space cooperation. Brazil s strategic orientations to space, which have changed over time, are evident through three distinct periods in the development of its national space program. The first period was distinguished by the military regime that developed the beginnings of the space program through a Brazilian Complete Space Mission plan. Following this, Brazil shifted to a strategy of cooperation that is represented by the China Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program. Since 1994, Brazil sought a greater degree of space-related independence with the creation of the Brazilian Space Agency to better coordinate and manage the development of space activities. Despite this effort, the agency has failed to successfully coordinate and manage as programs and projects are weakly interconnected and

21 Introduction 11 underfunded. This situation posits the need for more explicit strategic planning since new players are interested in and participate and benefit from the growing use of space applications in Brazil, and due to the development of Brazil, more generally, as a key power in the world. Space strategy: addressing challenges and fulfilling policy Ultimately, strategy needs to address challenges and fulfill policy in a number of ways. These ways are analyzed in this volume. First, is to instill the intellectual foundations for strategy in relation to the conduct of space activities, entailing the development of strategists that can think and act strategically. Second, is to not only focus on the formulation of strategy on the basis of policy, but also to pay attention to the factors, and political challenges, that influence implementation to allow for successful execution of strategy. Third, is to assure access to space capabilities, and, more generally, the global commons of space, including the development of circlesof-trust in values and behavioral norms among space actors to continue to allow for sustainable uses of space. Fourth, is to realize better unity of effort within and across the different space sectors from security space to commercial and civil space. This entails optimizing the management and organization of space programs and projects, and bridging commercial and government networks to enable more cooperative and fruitful relations that meet their goals and interests. Most critical, is strategy that helps to sustain an industrial base that is robust, vibrant, resilient, and capable to address strategic challenges; strategy that ensures a role for global space markets and commerce; and strategy that fosters and leverages capabilities and technological innovation. Fifth, is the need to continue to develop cooperation in relation to security space, like space situational awareness, and in civil space, such as with global space exploration strategies and global climate monitoring capabilities that address the strategic concerns of global climate change. Sixth, space strategy should proceed on the basis of the interdependent nature of the space arena, and in concert with, and recognition of, policy developments and strategic orientations among spacefaring states worldwide. Notes 1 Power in this context can be thought of as spacepower, which is the ability to exert influence in or from space in all conditions ranging from peace to war. See Charles D. Lutes, Peter L. Hays, Vincent A. Manzo, Lisa M. Yambrick, and

22 12 E. Sadeh M. Elaine Bunn, eds., Toward a Theory of Spacepower (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2011), edu/press/spacepower.html (accessed May 2012). 2 Ideally, there should first be policy formulation, then strategy directed at how to fulfill policy, followed by plans, and, finally, budgetary allocations to implement plans. In practice, all this is reversed in the case of the United States: the budget is first, then strategy is developed usually at the agency level, and, last, a policy is put forward. This leads to strategies that are less than optimal, and that fall short in providing top-level guidance and commitments that are essential for success. 3 See Special Issue: Towards a National Space Strategy, Astropolitics 8:2 3 (2010). 4 Although the global commons logic may obscure matters more than help them, as much of that approach is based on voluntary measures and mutual self-restraint, which lacks credible assurance, the mindset of a global commons is essential for effective management and governance of the space domain. 5 As part of the United Nations system of treaties, the legally binding part of the Outer Space Treaty Regime includes the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration Convention. The Moon Agreement was negotiated as well, but no space powers have ratified that agreement. In addition, there are five sets of non-binding legal principles adopted by the United Nations General Assembly that provide for the application of international space law: see United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law, unvienna.org/oosa/en/spacelaw/treaties.html (accessed May 2012). Other aspects of the formal regime of space law also include The Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, and The Administrative Regulations (Radio Regulations and International Telecommunication Regulations) that complement the Constitution. These agreements govern space-based telecommunications satellites as to spectrum and orbital slot allocations. Voluntary actions and mutual self-restraint approaches include the legal principles mentioned above, which are non-binding agreements. In addition, in 2007, the General Assembly endorsed the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and agreed that the voluntary guidelines for the mitigation of space debris reflected the existing practices as developed by a number of national and international organizations, and invited Member States of the United Nations to implement those guidelines through relevant national mechanisms, DEBRIS_MITIGATION_GUIDELINES.pdf (accessed May 2012). One additional voluntary agreement of note is the proposed European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. See Chapter 12 in this volume on European experiences with space policies and strategies. This code has engendered international dialogue on responsible space behavior for the sustainable uses of space. 6 Wealth creation, or wealth building, refers to the combined use of engineering, technology, and human skills to maximize the creation, production, and delivery of goods and services that is needed to raise the standard of living, increase employment, spur education, and grow the economy. 7 In the area of regulations concerning export controls, for example, the United States government hinders commercial space and aerospace industries, eroding the space industrial base. To address this concern, the Obama Administration established the foundations for a New Export Control System to Strengthen National Security and the Competiveness of Key U.S. Manufacturing and Technological Sectors,

23 Introduction 13 president-obama-lays-foundation-a-new-export-control-system-strengthen-n (accessed May 2012). Also, see Report to Congress, Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law ), Risk Assessment of the United States Space Export Control Policy, Departments of Defense and State (released to public April 2012), pdf (accessed May 2012). 8 For a relevant long-term strategic view on Earth observations, see Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2007). 9 Strategic orientations indicate space goals and objectives of states. This is useful because there are some ambiguous areas in the formal documents published by national space agencies. One common orientation worldwide is to have an important role in international political leadership even considering the specific objectives related to the economic and social contexts of individual spacefaring states. Paraphrased from Giorgio Petroni, Karen Venturini, Chiara Verbano, and Silvia Cantarello, Discovering the Basic Strategic Orientation of Big Space Agencies, Space Policy 25:1 (February 2009): For example, in the case of the United States, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) officials at the creation of the agency decided to focus their efforts on human spaceflight, Moon and Mars missions, and human settlement of the Solar System. Its leaders made a conscious decision to downplay space applications projects, exclusive of technological research and development, and eschew operational activities. They did so in favor of concentrating on the human exploration and development of space. In so doing, NASA fell into the prestige trap that dominated this mission. In essence, NASA sought for ever greater space spectaculars featuring human involvement. Power and prestige, therefore, has cast a long shadow on the space agency, forcing it into a series of programs that have been oversold and undervalued. Paraphrased from Roger Launius, Imprisoned in a Tesseract: NASA s Human Spaceflight Effort and the Prestige Trap, Astropolitics 10:2 (2012): See Russian Space Programs in 2011: Plans and Reality, com/2011.html (accessed May 2012). 12 For a listing of space-related agencies and institutions in China, see Eligar Sadeh, ed., The Politics of Space: A Survey (Routledge, 2011), A-Z Glossary of Space Organizations. Space organizations of note in China, in addition to the role of the People s Liberation Army (PLA) include: China National Space Administration; Center for Space Science and Applied Research; China Aerospace Corporation; China Great Wall Industry Corporation; China Aerospace Machinery and Electronics Corporation; China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation; Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense; State Aerospace Bureau; China Satellite Launch and Control General; Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology; Chinese Academy of Sciences; Center for Space Science and Applied Research; Chinese Society of Astronautics. A primary impediment to international cooperation with China s space program concerns organizational structure. This is due to the joint civil, commercial, and military implementation approach. From China s perspective, this is a sensible and economic method of conserving limited resources to enable growth for all the sectors. Because of the dual-use nature of space technology, it is likely that this will continue to constrain cooperative efforts. At the same time, China has increasingly opened the space program to the world. This has been enabled by the commercial and civil benefits gained from cooperative space projects with other countries. These projects have, in turn, promoted further openness and economic interconnection with the rest of the world.