An industrial view on Nuclear Safety Culture

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Ernest Banks
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1 An industrial view on Nuclear Safety Culture Manfred Haferburg Senior Nuclear Safety Advisor Paris/France

2 Talk Outline Nuclear Safety Culture the reality. A classical near-miss. Two ways to treat the near miss. Work towards the Safety Culture Principles What can we conclude? 2

3 Safety? no events Nuclear Safety Culture the reality Regulatory Body Cost Reduction Production goals Reorganization Staff Reduction Administration Staff-Meetings Contractor Quality Safety Culture. Every 9 minutes another activity 3

4 A classical Near Miss Oh, I have been lucky! Nothing has happened! Did I make a mistake? I ll keep my mouth shut The boss will be angry and a normal reaction. 4

5 A classical Near Miss Trust Culture: the worker reports the near miss is Management analyses the issue: the root causes are assessed Corrective Action Program: Corrective actions are implemented and a systematic Safety Culture reaction.

6 4 Principles of Safety Culture are directly effected 1. Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety. 2. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety. 3. Trust permeates the organisation. 4. Decision-making reflects safety first. 5. Nuclear technology is recognised as special and unique. 6. A questioning attitude is cultivated. 7. Organisational learning is embraced. 8. Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination Question: Where is the response-ability to implement these principles?

7 A classical Near Miss Oh, I have been lucky! I need to report it. We can learn. Corrective Actions : Human Performance- Training, Technical modification Why did it happen? My boss will appreciate my reporting and a healthy Safety Culture response. 7

Kiyoshi Kurokawa Chairman of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident was a profoundly manmade disaster that could and

8 Kiyoshi Kurokawa Chairman of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident was a profoundly manmade disaster that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. multitude errors and willful negligence left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11. Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to sticking with the program ; our groupism; and our insularity Conclusion: Fukushima was a Man(ager)made Disaster

9 Principle 2: Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety. Managers practice visible leadership in the field Leadership Oversight Visibility Safety Training Learning Listening Management considers the employee perspective in understanding and analysing issues. Managers provide appropriate oversight Managers are personally involved in high quality training Leaders recognise that production goals, if not properly communicated, can send mixed signals on nuclear safety. important operational decisions are communicated promptly to workers. Selection and evaluation of managers consider their abilities to contribute to a strong nuclear safety culture. WANO Guideline on Nuclear Safety Culture Conclusion: A strong Safety Culture starts in the office of the CEO!

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission s Oversight of Safety Culture

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission s Oversight of Safety Culture Diane J. Sieracki Senior Safety Culture Program Manager Office of Enforcement IAEA TM October 6-8, 2014 1 2 Outline History of safety culture