Use of Communications EW in a Network Centric Warfare Environment

Transcription

1 Use of Communications EW in a Network Centric Warfare Environment TTCP EWS AG5 Brief to the 2008 AOC International Exhibition and Symposium Ian Coat EWRD, DSTO

2 Release and Distribution This document contains Information authorised under the auspices of The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) for unlimited release and distribution. The Technical Cooperation Program is defined under a Memorandum of Understanding among the Minister of Defence on behalf of the Department of Defence of Australia, the Department of National Defence of Canada, the New Zealand Defence Force, the Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Secretary of Defense on behalf of the Department of Defense of the United States of America. Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, Canada, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), United Kingdom, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), Australia, Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), United States of America, Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), United States of America,

3 Outline Overview of TTCP, EWS, AG5 Role for CEW in Network Protection CEW Functions and Capabilities Radio Spectrum Awareness The Emitter Map Concepts for CEW in a Network Centric Warfare Environment TTCP Workshop on the Robustness and Vulnerability of NCW

4 The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) is an international organisation that collaborates in defence scientific and technical information exchange; program harmonisation and alignment; and shared research activities for the five nations (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Public Website:

5 Groups within TTCP AER C3I CBD EWS HUM JSA LND MAR MAT SEN WPN Aerospace Systems Group Command, Control, Communications and Information Systems Group Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Defence Group Electronic Warfare Systems Group Human Resources and Performance Group Joint Systems and Analysis Group Land Systems Group Maritime Systems Group Materials and Processing Technology Group Sensors Group Conventional Weapons Technology Group Each Group is comprised of several Technical Panels and Action Groups.

6 TTCP EWS AG5 The Electronic Warfare Systems (EWS) group is responsible for science and technology collaboration in EW. Action Group 5 (AG5) is tasked with studying new concepts for Electronic Warfare and Network Centric Operations. Part of the AG5 study is to investigate how Communication Electronic Warfare (CEW) can assist in protecting the radio-link portion of communications networks in a Network Centric Warfare (NCW) force.

7 The Role of CEW in Network Protection In the 20 th century, radar and Radar Electronic Warfare evolved to provide situational awareness and platform protection. In the 21 st century, Communication EW will evolve to provide radio spectrum awareness and network protection for the Network Centric Warfare force.

8 Communications Electronic Warfare CEW is comprised of three related disciplines: Communication Electronic Support (signal interception, emitter locating, analysis) Communication Electronic Attack (jamming, deception) Communication Electronic Protection (anti-jam radios) Communication Electronic Support (CES) provides: Surveillance of the radio spectrum Identification of radio signals and spectrum usage Recovery of message content Geolocation and tracking of emitters

9 Radio Spectrum Monitoring by a CEW sensor Detect all signals in range of sensor Identify signal types and spectral usage Direction-Find and geo-locate emitters Intercept signals of interest

10 The CEW Emitter Map Associate radio signals to emitters over time for area of interest Geo-location and tracking of emitters CES CES Classify emitters Identify network structure of emitters CES CES

11 Shared Radio Spectrum Awareness for NCW - the RF Common Operating Picture Detect usage of the radio spectrum, locate emitters, determine identity, track which sets of emitters are using what parts of the radio spectrum, by region, over time. Radio Frequency Area of interest Unknown Hostile Neutral Friendly

12 Detection of Network Jamming CES systems may locate the source of interference using network information and spectral surveillance Hostile Jammer Jamming disrupts RF Link between forces Shared RF COP Network Management

13 Radio Spectrum Awareness Need Input from the network Blue Force Tracking (who, where, when) Wireless networks and spectrum usage Reports of outages and interference of wireless links Need to know the RF environment Map local, civilian use of the spectrum Model radio propagation environment Detect and track changes in spectrum usage Need sufficient CES capability Quantity of sensors required to cover area of interest Continuous frequency coverage over all comms bands Ability to identify all types of radio signals Geo-location of emitters

14 TTCP Workshop on the Robustness and Vulnerability of Network Centric Warfare Workshop Objectives: Identify vulnerabilities of NCW systems to attack; Identify means to defend NCW systems from attack; Identify the technology and procedural gaps that may present vulnerabilities to NCW systems, including those unique to coalition operations; and Identify future research activities to address the vulnerabilities of NCW systems. Hosted by DRDC Ottawa in May 2007 Involved 33 scientists from US, UK, AUS, and CA. Contained 26 presentations on vulnerabilities, robustness and research in NCW systems.

15 Coalition Networks Theatre Command National Command UAV Dismounted Soldiers Littoral Urban Tactical HQ Different protocols Rural

16 Network Centric Warfare Systems The following are examples of Network Centric Warfare Systems and capabilities that could be targeted by hostile actions against the network: HQ Command, Control and Communications (C3) Situation Awareness (SA) Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance Air Defence, Artillery, and Network-Controlled Weapons Logistics and Supply Vehicle and Dismounted Infantry C3/SA

17 NCW Vulnerabilities Considered Electronic Warfare Networks and Communications Network-Enabled Systems Human Factors

18 NCW Workshop Summary There are potential vulnerabilities to Network Centric Warfare and network-enabled systems. Detailed understanding of all potential vulnerabilities, including technological, organisational, and human-related, is essential to developing and operating NCW systems that are robust, reliable, and effective. This is particularly important to address asymmetric attacks against the network. Significant research is required to properly investigate the vulnerabilities of NCW systems and assess levels of robustness.

19 Questions?