Nuclear Regulation: Purpose, Philosophy, Principles, Processes and Values - A View. By Mike Weightman

Transcription

1 Nuclear Regulation: Purpose, Philosophy, Principles, Processes and Values - A View By Mike Weightman

2 Contents What is the Purpose of Nuclear Regulation? What is risk and safety? What is the underlying Philosophy of nuclear regulation? What are the Principles? What are the Processes? How do you regulate Safety Cultures? Can it operate successfully in isolation to other parts of the Nuclear System? What are its underpinning Values? 2

3 Nuclear Regulation - Purpose To secure the protection of people, society and the environment from the risks (hazards) of the nuclear industry (allowing society the option to realise the benefits) lezione 1 3

4 What is Risk and Safety? Risk chance of bad consequences, loss Safety Freedom from Risks No such thing as absolute safety or zero risk Living is risky We tolerate risks to achieve benefits Some examples 4

5 Examples of Risk: Chance of Death in UK Population l 5

6 (7) Occupational exposure limit 20 msv/y Public exposure limit 1 msv/y Risk from radiation exposure 0,05 chance of fatal cancer per SV Exposure to Ionising Radiation: Units of Dose (msv/yr) 6

7 Nuclear Safety: risks of accidents - Fukushima 2011 Tsunami following an earthquake level 9.0 direct impact: killed around 20,000 people Fukushima Dai-ichi Estimated releases 10% of Chernobyl Effective evacuation 160,000 people evacuated 30 workers with doses > 100 msv Limited health consequences from radiation (WHO, 2013) But very heavy economic, social and environmental consequences 7

8 Nuclear Regulation: A Philosophy Justification of activities of nuclear industry - Government Limitation on risks incurred Optimisation - Reduce risks further by application of ALARA(or ALARP) towards safety goals ensuring a culture of continuous improvement (foundation stone of safety culture) lezione 1 8

9 A Risk Framework for Nuclear Regulation in the UK Basic Safety Level ALARP Reduce the risks until the costs in time, trouble and expense is grossly disproportionate Basic Safety Objective

10 Nuclear Safety: Continuous Improvement Risk = event frequency consequences. Reduction in design estimate of the large release frequency between reactor generations over the past five decades. IAEA, 2004 (8) 10

11 Nuclear Regulation: Principles Independence Proportionality Objectivity, rationality, science/technical based with highest technical competence Consistency Openness and transparency: communicating with all stakeholders, a duty listening, explaining in context, being proactive 11

12 Independence: - Structural - Financial - Cultural

13 Nuclear Regulation: Processes Setting principles/standards, guidance, regulations Assessing safety/security/safeguards cases/arrangements Permissioning activities Inspecting Enforcing Influencing people and organisations: safety culture lezione 1 13

14 Why is Influencing Safety Culture of Nuclear Industry so vital? Organisational Learning Vision Regulatory Leverage Impac t X Public Confidence Reality & Compliance Mind map Systems Safety Cultures Organisational Structures X 1000 X100 Patterns Processes X 10 Events Regulators influence safety culture for better or worse, whether they intend to or not and it can have far greater impact need to with others. Plant/ Operations X 1 Regulate Influence

15 Safety Culture Simply... its what people do when you are not there Cannot legislate for it But... Regulators influence it in the nuclear industry for better, or worse Its how you go about your regulation that matters obtaining the skills is essential high technical, communication and behavioural skills 15

16 Nuclear Regulators: the Crucial Part of a Nuclear System lezione 1 16

17 Technical Assurance of nuclear power plant safety is not enough 3 Safety Functions: Contain, Control, Cool Contain the radiation Control the nuclear and chemical reactions Cool the fuel Multiple barriers (defence in depth) to stop failure of the Safety Functions Diversity, redundancy, segregation of barriers/safety systems No single point failure Identify hazards, initiating events to realise them and failure paths Demonstrate through deterministic and probabilistic Safety Case 17

18 18 Technical Defence In Depth - Generally Described in Five Levels Level of defence in depth Level 1 Level 2 Plant Status Objective Normal Operation Operational Occurrences Prevention of abnormal operation and failures by design Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures Level 3 Accidents Control of accidents within the Level 4 Beyond Design Base Accidents e.g. core melt accident design basis Control of severe plant conditions in which the design basis may be exceeded, including the prevention of fault progression and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents Essential Means Conservative design, construction, maintenance and operation in accordance with appropriate safety margins, engineering practices and quality levels Control, limiting and protection systems and other surveillance features Engineered safety features and accident procedures Additional measures and procedures to prevent or mitigate fault progression and for on-site emergency management Level 5 Significant off site release of radioactivity Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant releases of radioactive materials Emergency management and on-site and off-site emergency response

19 19 Technical Defence In Depth Fukushima: Common Mode Failure Level of defence in depth Level 1 Level 2 Plant Status Objective Normal Operation Operational Occurrences Prevention of abnormal operation and failures by design Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures Level 3 Accidents Control of accidents within the Level 4 Beyond Design Base Accidents e.g. core melt accident design basis Control of severe plant conditions in which the design basis may be exceeded, including the prevention of fault progression and mitigation of the consequences of severe accidents Essential Means Conservative design, construction, maintenance and operation in accordance with appropriate safety margins, engineering practices and quality levels Control, limiting and protection systems and other surveillance features Engineered safety features and accident procedures Additional measures and procedures to prevent or mitigate fault progression and for on-site emergency management Level 5 Significant off site release of radioactivity Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant releases of radioactive materials Emergency management and on-site and off-site emergency response

20 Fukushima lesson: technical DID can be subject to common mode failure through Nuclear System Failure: Need Strong Nuclear System Defence in Depth: Institutional Multiple and Diverse Independent Barriers Underpinned by safety culture of Continuous Improvement -, never complacent, open reporting, safety first; and compatible values

21 Nuclear Regulation as one part of the institutional defence in depth system A. Strong competent self regulating Industry B. Strong Regulator C. Strong competent Stakeholders - Each barrier is Independent and has Sub-barriers within it - Industry and the Regulator have to: have openness, transparency and accountability as a way of life have an underpinning strong vibrant safety culture and nuclear values welcome challenge with passion to improve lezione 1 21

22 Components of the Nuclear Industry Barrier in a State or Region Licensee I.1 I.2 I.3 I.4 SQEP Technical/Design/op erational capability State/Region Industry Peer Pressure Safety Directors Forum, INPO, etc. International Industry Peer Pressure/Revie w WANO Missions and Requirements International Institutional Review IAEA OSART Missions Independent Nuclear Safety Assessment Nuclear Industry Association, Nuclear Energy Institute, ANS Bilateral/Multilate ral Organisations e.g. CANDU Owners Group Nuclear Safety Committee Nuclear Leadership/Culture/Values 22

23 Components of a Strong Institution Regulatory Barrier R.1 R.2 R.3 R.4 Regulatory Authority Special Outside Technical Advice International Peer Pressure International Peer Reviews World Class Technical/Regulatory Capability E.g. Standing Panel of experts nominated by stakeholders CNI Advisory Panel/ Groupe Permanent d Experts NEA CNRA & CSNI committees and working groups IAEA IRRS missions Organisational Structure with internal standards, assurance, OEF, policy, strategy, etc. Special Expert Topic Groups - Fukushima - Aircraft Crash WENRA reference levels, reviews, groups INRA top regulators ENSREG Reviews Accountability to Governing Body Board, Commission, etc. IAEA Safety Standard meetings, etc. Nuclear Leadership/Culture/Values 23

24 Components of the Strong Stakeholder Institutional Barrier S.1 S.2 S.3 S.4 S.5 S.6 S.7 Workers Public Parliament National & Local Gov. Neighbour s Media NGOs Industry and Regulatory Routine Supply of Information Routine Reports on Activities and Decisions Special Reports on Matters of Interest Responsiveness to Requests for Information Routine and Special Meetings Openness & Transparency, Accountability, Assurance Industry/Regulator Culture and Capability 24

25 Nuclear Regulators: Some Values? lezione 1 25

26 Nurturing a culture of Welcoming Challenge and seeking to Listen, Learn and Improve Loss of Swedish Vasa Warship in 1628 in first 2km of maiden voyage fear of telling the King that top heavy and need to delay

27 Strong: not about brute strength or power but Inner Strength, Strategy and Skills David and Goliath

28 Objectivity: Decisions based on rationality, facts, knowledge and experience Newton

29 Responsive: to survive and prosper it s not the biggest but the one who best responds to their changing environment Darwin

30 Great Resilience: around a clear vision and strategy Mandela

31 Integrity

32 Summary: Your Regulatory Leadership is Vital - Live the Nuclear Regulatory Values l 32