The state of computer ethics as a philosophical field of inquiry: Some contemporary perspectives, future projections, and current resources

Transcription

1 Ethics and Information Technology 3: , Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. The state of computer ethics as a philosophical field of inquiry: Some contemporary perspectives, future projections, and current resources Herman T. Tavani Department of Philosophy, Rivier College, Nashua, NH USA htavani@rivier.edu Abstract. The present article focuses upon three aspects of computer ethics as a philosophical field: contemporary perspectives, future projections, and current resources. Several topics are covered, including various computer ethics methodologies, the uniqueness of computer ethics questions, and speculations about the impact of globalization and the internet. Also examined is the suggestion that computer ethics may disappear in the future. Finally, there is a brief description of computer ethics resources, such as journals, textbooks, conferences and associations. Key words: conceptual muddles, cyberethics, disclosive computer ethics, global information ethics, internet ethics, just consequentialism, logical malleability, mainstream computer ethics, policy vacuums When invited to participate in a conference panel 1 that would discuss the current and future states of the field of computer ethics, I had two very different reactions. On the one hand, I was delighted to have an opportunity to be on a panel of distinguished scholars; on the other hand, I felt somewhat uneasy because I did not know how I could possibly address, in the relatively brief time that would be allotted to each speaker, the myriad issues and themes that seemingly would need to be covered in an overview of the state of the field of computer ethics. Realizing that I could not possibly comment on all, or even most, of the important issues and themes, I decided to limit my discussion to three topical areas of computer ethics as a philosophical 2 field: contemporary perspectives, future projections, and current resources. 3 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as part of a panel discussion at the 15th Annual Conference on Computing and Philosophy (CAP 2000) at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA (USA), August 10 12, I am grateful to Terry Bynum and to the Research Center on Computing and Society (RCCS) at Southern Connecticut State University (USA) for the support that they provided to me for this project. 2 My focus in the essay will be on computer ethics as a philosophical field. It is perhaps important to note at the outset that many computer scientists and social scientists have a very different conception of computer ethics as an academic field of study different both in terms of scope and methodology from that of philosophers working in the field. For an account of computer ethics that represents the view of many practitioners in the discipline of computer science, see Gotterbarn (1991). 3 The first and third parts of the present essay expand on material included in my article Computer ethics: current perspectives and resources, APA (American Philosophical Asso- Some contemporary perspectives When James Moor s classic article What is Computer Ethics? appeared in the October 1985 issue of Metaphilosophy, the impact of computers and information technology on our social institutions was arguably very different from its effect today. 4 At that time, there was no World Wide Web; and the internet, as understood in its current sense, was a fledging technology. 5 Also, in 1985 personal computers were relatively new and were owned by proportionately few persons. The image of computers held by many, during that period, was that of a large, unfriendly mainframe, i.e., a giant machine whose operations were understood only by a select few technical gurus capable of writing programs in esoteric languages. Today, of course, a ciation) Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers: , Summer It is perhaps worth noting that some philosophers had been writing about ethical issues in computing for at least one decade before the appearance of Moor s award-winning essay. In fact, Walter Maner claims to have coined the expression computer ethics in 1976 (see Maner 1996). 5 Although the ARPANET the Internet s predecessor had been available to certain governmental agencies as well as to certain academic institutions with government-funded research projects in the US during the 1960s and 1970s, it was not until the early 1980s that the standard protocol for the Internet, known as TCP/IP (Transmissions Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), would be developed to enable privately owned computer networks to be interconnected. And it was not until the early 1990s that the World-Wide-Web, whose protocol (HTTP or Hyper Text Transfer Protocol), was designed by Swiss physicist Tim Berners-Lee, was developed.

2 98 HERMAN T. TAVANI computer is no longer viewed merely as a machine that crunches numbers, but is perhaps more commonly thought of either as a communications medium through which one is able to conduct many of the affairs of one s day-to-day life, or as a tool that is essential for carrying out many of one s tasks in the workplace. Indeed, it would be difficult now for many of us to imagine our lives without computers. Because computer technology has changed significantly in recent years, one might assume that the issues considered by computer ethicists would have evolved accordingly. In one sense, that assumption would seem correct; in another sense, however, it would not. In the early days of computer ethics, much of the focus was on concerns related to the storage and exchange of personal information in large databases in both the public and private spheres. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s some feared that the federal government would create a huge centralized database of electronic records with extensive information about each citizen. In the private sphere, there was and still is much concern about the exchange of personal information contained in electronic records that reside in commercial databases. As personal computing became widespread in the 1980s, questions having to do with whether it was ever morally permissible to use a computer to copy proprietary software programs, as well as more general questions involving intellectual property rights, were added to the list of issues given serious consideration by computer ethicists. And with the advent of the internet and the Web, questions about certain forms of online behavior, e.g., online activities alleged by some to raise new concerns related to free speech, anonymity, and so forth, have also come to be included among the issues currently considered. As mentioned above, the purpose of this section is to discuss some contemporary perspectives in the field of computer ethics. So I will say nothing further about its historical development. For an excellent discussion of the history of computer ethics, see Bynum (1999). The remainder of this section will focus on three current areas of debate: (1) the question of uniqueness of computer ethics issues, (2) computer ethics methodology, and (3) speculation about the impact of globalization and the internet on the field of computer ethics. Are computer ethics issues unique ethical issues? The legitimacy of computer ethics as a separate field of applied ethics has been and continues to be challenged. One aspect of this challenge is apparent in an ongoing debate over whether there is anything unique or even special about the moral problems considered by computer ethicists. At one end of the spectrum are those who believe that, essentially, there is nothing new or special about ethical issues involving the use of computers. Proponents of this view claim that privacy violations are privacy violations and that theft is theft whether or not the particular privacy violations or particular thefts happen to involve the use of computers. At the other extreme are those such as Walter Maner (1996) who hold that computer use has generated a series of new and unique ethical issues that could not have existed if computer technology had not been invented. Maner argues that the failure to find satisfactory non-computer analogies for moral issues involving computers testifies to the uniqueness of computer ethics. Deborah Johnson (1994) has taken what could be viewed as a middle ground in this debate. Using a genus-species analogy, she suggests that ethical issues raised by computer technology can best be understood as a new species of (existing) generic moral problems. Johnson has also suggested that one s perspective on this debate 6 is often influenced by one s starting point. She notes that if one starts from the vantage point of technology, for example, one is drawn to the uniqueness of many of the features of computers. On the other hand, if one starts with ethics, one focuses more broadly on human behavior and human values. What brings the two starting points together, she argues (Johnson 1999), is the recognition that technology provides the instrumentation of human action. 7 A somewhat different approach to the question of uniqueness has been taken by James Moor (1985) who argues that because computer technology, unlike previous technologies, is logically malleable, 8 it 6 For a more detailed account of the arguments and positions involving the uniqueness debate, see Johnson (1994) and Gotterbarn and Rogerson (1998). 7 Johnson s argument is much more complicated than in the account described above. Although an in-depth examination of her claims regarding the instrumentation of human action would take us too far afield from the main thrust of this essay, the following brief remarks by Johnson on this topic might help us to appreciate her main point. Noting that ethical issues have to do with human beings and their actions and interactions, Johnson points out that whereas in some cases human actions are simply instrumented through the human body, in other cases such actions can be instrumented through technology (in addition to the human body). This distinction is important, she further notes, because technological instrumentation changes what is possible for humans to do. 8 In claiming that computers are logically malleable, Moor (1985) points to the fact that computers can be shaped and molded to do any activity that can be characterized in terms of inputs, outputs and logical operations. He goes on to note that [b]ecause logic applies everywhere, the potential applications of computer technology appear limitless.

3 THE STATE OF COMPUTER ETHICS 99 gives rise to new possibilities for human action. These new possibilities can, in turn, create certain vacuums i.e., vacuums regarding normative rules and policies (viz., policy vacuums ) to guide the new choices for action made possible by computers, and vacuums regarding conceptual frameworks that enable us to understand clearly the nature of certain normative issues that emerge. Moor claims that even after the conceptual muddles are resolved and the emergent issues have become more clearly understood, we sometimes discover that existing policies cannot be applied easily to those issues. So we often need to create and justify new policies in response to certain vacuums generated by computing technology. On Moor s analysis, then, computer ethics is the specialized field of identifying policy vacuums created by computers, clarifying conceptual confusions surrounding those issues, and then formulating and justifying new policies for those areas in which either there are no existing policies or where existing policies cannot be adequately extended. The field of computer ethics is needed, Moor (1998) argues, because routine ethics is not able to handle adequately many of the normative issues that can and do arise from the use of computing technology. What is the proper computer ethics methodology? For many philosophers working in computer ethics, Moor s approach (described in the preceding section) has become the standard or mainstream methodology for this relatively new field of applied ethics. Recently, some suggestions have been put forth for ways in which mainstream methodology might be modified or extended to include interdisciplinary considerations (Brey 2000, 2001) and feminist theory (Adam 2001). In a critique of what he calls mainstream computer ethics, Brey has suggested an approach, called disclosive computer ethics, which is concerned with what he describes as the moral deciphering of embedded values and norms in computer systems, applications, and practices. He argues that research in computer ethics should be multi-level and interdisciplinary, and should distinguish among three levels: a disclosure level, a theoretical level, and an application level. Brey believes that philosophers, computer scientists, and social scientists need to collaborate at the various levels in the research process. At the disclosure level, for example, all three can collaborate to disclose embedded normativity in computer systems and practices. At the theoretical level, on the other hand, philosophers develop and modify moral theory; and at the application level, they can draw from research performed at the other two levels. Unlike Brey who focuses on the need to modify the standard computer ethics methodology in order to disclose biases involving embedded normativity in computer systems, Adam (2001) believes that the appropriate method for conducting research in computer ethics needs to address biases related to gender. She considers how feminist ethics can be combined with empirical studies that emphasize observation and interviewing in order to move computer ethics to a level at which certain implications for gender are recognized. These implications can, she further notes, affect our attitudes and policies towards computer ethics issues involving privacy and power. Both Adam and Brey seem to suggest that adopting slightly different methodologies from that which some now refer to as mainstream computer ethics could influence the ways in which we frame and revise computer ethics policies in the future. As noted in the preceding section, Moor argues that not only must we revise existing policies and frame some new ones, but we must also justify those policies. To justify policies involving moral issues, philosophers have typically appealed to one or more standard ethical theories. But some have questioned whether it would always be possible to employ such theories when attempting to resolve certain computer ethics issues, especially if at least some of those issues might be unique ethical issues. Although a number of philosophers have recently argued that traditional ethical theories, e.g., utilitarian, deontological, and aretaic (virtue ethics) theories, cannot be easily applied to all computer ethics issues, their reasons for holding such a view, as well as the alternative theories they put forth, differ markedly. Luciano Floridi (1999), who believes that the greatest challenge to computer ethics in terms of its philosophical status is methodological in nature, has recently claimed that the issues of computer ethics strain the conceptual resources of traditional ethical theories. Although some would no doubt disagree with Floridi on this point, others have put forth either new theories or new variations and combinations of standard ethical theories in order to meet the challenges that certain computer ethics issues have posed for traditional ethical theory. Jeroen van den Hoven (1997), for example, believes that a theory, first articulated by John Rawls, called The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE), offers the best model of practical moral reasoning available for justifying new policies involving computer ethics issues. Using an example involving the privacy debate, van den Hoven illustrates how the WRE method can be applied. A somewhat different approach has recently been suggested by Bernard Gert (1999) who believes that his system of common morality (developed more

4 100 HERMAN T. TAVANI fully in his book Morality: Its Nature and Justification, Oxford University Press, 1998) can help us to understand better, and in some cases resolve, moral issues associated with computing technology. Gert illustrates his methodology via an example involving software piracy. Building on an aspect of Gert s theory of common morality, involving the notion of impartiality, Moor (1999) has recently developed a conceptual framework called just consequentialism. To show how his just consequentialist theory can be applied to policy vacuums resulting from computer technology, Moor considers a scenario involving the installation of defective software chips. 9 Adam (2000) has noted that traditional ethical theories largely ignore considerations of gender. Because computer ethics has employed mostly traditional ethical theories, Adam suggests that it too has failed to take into consideration important issues involving gender. So Adam believes that computer ethics should appeal to feminist ethics to enhance its theoretical substance. Adam and Ofori-Amanfo (2000) claim that by appealing to a feminist ethics, such as the ethics of care, we can develop an alternative reading of some typical computer ethics issues, such as the hacking problem. The impact of globalization and the internet on computer ethics Because of the global impact of computing in recent years, and because of the merging of computing and communications technologies that has also recently occurred, the field of computer ethics might be perceived as one that is currently in a state of flux or transition. One question surrounding this unsettled state has to do with what the field should now be called, i.e., does the expression computer ethics still capture adequately the nature and scope of issues currently entertained? Bynum and Rogerson (1996) have suggested the use of the expression Global Information Ethics to describe the field. Others (see van den Hoven, Introna, Johnson and Nissenbaum 1999) have used the expression Information and Communications Technology Ethics or ICT Ethics to attempt to capture the convergence of informationrelated and communications-related ethical issues in a global context. To date, there is no clear agreement on what new label should be used to describe the field; nor, for that matter, is there agreement that a new label is needed. 9 Whereas Moor s just consequentialism incorporates aspects of utilitarian and deontological theories, Moor elsewhere (1998b) shows how certain principles of virtue ethics also can be applied to computer ethics, especially to those issues involving computer professionals. Another question of current interest has to do with the impact of the internet and the Web for the field of computer ethics. Has internet technology made possible certain ethical issues that could not have existed (or at least did not exist) in the pre-internet era? Johnson (1997) has argued that with respect to ethical considerations, internet technology has three special features or characteristics worth considering: its scope, which is global and interactive; the ability to communicate with anonymity; andthereproducibility of information on the medium. Although she notes that these features may make a moral difference in that they make behavior in an electronic network morally different from offline behavior, Johnson does not claim that the internet has introduced any new ethical issues. Certain authors have recently begun to use expressions such as Internet Ethics (see, e.g., Langford 2000) and CyberEthics (see, e.g., Spinello 2000; Willard 1997) in ways that might be interpreted by some to imply that the internet has generated new ethical issues and that possibly a separate field of study dedicated to ethical issues involving this relatively new medium is needed. Clearly, the internet has perpetuated and, in certain cases, exacerbated many of the ethical issues associated with the use of earlier computing technologies. But has it introduced any new ethical issues? To answer such a question, perhaps it would help to consider a particular computer ethics issue, such as personal privacy and computers, vis-à-vis the internet. Helen Nissenbaum (1998) has recently shown how certain intrusions into the activities of online users are not currently protected by privacy norms because information available online is often treated as information in public space or what she describes as a sphere other than the intimate. She also notes that few normative theories sufficiently attend to the public aspect of privacy and that philosophical work on privacy suffers a theoretical blind spot when it comes to the question of protecting privacy in public. While Nissenbaum correctly points out the limitations of normative theories of privacy with the respect to protecting privacy in public, some might infer from Nissenbaum s analysis that the internet, as a public space, presents us with a new set of privacy concerns. But is such an inference warranted? Agreeing with Nissenbaum that activities on the internet involving the monitoring and recording of certain kinds of personal information can cause us to reconsider our assumptions regarding the private vs. public character of personal information currently available online, Tavani (1999a) argues that Moor s control/restricted access theory of privacy (see Moor 1997) can be extended to resolve issues involving the protection of personal privacy in the public space of

5 THE STATE OF COMPUTER ETHICS 101 the internet. Despite the challenges that the internet has posed with respect to protecting certain kinds of personal information, there is no compelling evidence that any genuinely new privacy issues have been introduced by that medium or that we need a new category of internet privacy, as some have suggested. Analogously, there does not appear to be a convincing argument for the claim that a separate field of internet ethics is needed, either. 10 Future projections In the preceding section we considered some of the ways in which globalization and the advent of the internet have affected the current debates in computer ethics. But how exactly will continued global interaction and technological innovation affect the future of the field of computer ethics? Some have already put forth explicit hypotheses, while others have speculated informally about the future of the field. A very interesting view about the future has recently been sketched out by Deborah Johnson (1999). 11 Will computer ethics disappear in the future? Johnson suggests that the field of computers ethics, at least as we currently understand it, may and, perhaps should, disappear in the future. She believes that what we now view as issues in computer ethics might well become integrated into the issues of ordinary ethics. Johnson is very careful to point out, however, that the issues themselves will not disappear; rather, they will not be posed or framed as issues of computer ethics. 12 Although I will not do justice to Johnson s argument in the space of this essay, I will nonetheless try to describe what I believe to be an essential point in her overall claim. Johnson argues that computer technology instruments human action in ways that it has never been instrumented before She goes on to note, however, that once the new instrumentation is incorporated into ethical thinking, it becomes the 10 For an interesting discussion of which features of Internet technology are either new or unique, see Weckert (2000). 11 Terrell Ward Bynum (2000) has recently referred to Johnson s views about the future of computer ethics as the Johnson hypothesis, which he contrasts with the Gorniak hypothesis. I do not discuss Gorniak s views in this essay. For an account of that hypothesis, see Bynum s article as well as his article in the present issue of Ethics and Information Technology. 12 It should be noted that Johnson s argument is somewhat more complex than the way in which it is presented above. See her ETHICOMP99 keynote address for more details. presumed background condition. And, as we come to presume computer technology as part of the world we live in, Johnson predicts that computer ethics as such is likely to disappear. Is Johnson s prediction plausible? When considered from the vantage point of the cluster of computer ethics issues involving privacy, security, property, and free speech, her speculation about the future of the field would seem fairly cogent. After all, as computing becomes part of our presumed background condition, privacy issues involving computing would not seem to be essentially different in nature from issues of privacy in general. However, when viewed from the vantage point of of computers ethics an an area of professional ethics or as a branch of applied philosophy, Johnson s position can be challenged. Her position can also be challenged when considered from the point of view of certain computer ethics issues related to artificial intelligence (AI). Let us briefly consider each type of challenge. First consider a possible response from those who see computer ethics primarily as a field of professional ethics concerned with issues of responsibility and conduct for computer professionals. Some proponents of this view, including computer science practitioners such as Gotterbarn (1991), would likely respond to Johnson s prediction by pointing out that since issues involving responsibility for professionals working in the computing field will not go away in the future, computer ethics itself, i.e., as a field of professional ethics, will not go away. But what about computer ethics as a branch of applied ethics? Antonio Marturano (2000) has recently responded to Johnson by claiming that there are two ways of interpreting her claim that computer ethics will disappear: (i) computer ethics as an aspect of applied ethics will disappear, and (ii) computer ethics as an autonomous discipline will disappear. Marturano believes that because computers (and moral issues related to computing) have become so pervasive in professional and scientific fields, if (i) occurs then the entire field of applied ethics itself would disappear as well. However, that scenario is unlikely, Marturano further contends, because biologists and engineers cannot think about their own dilemmas without having to deal with the role of computers in their disciplines. So he concludes that computer ethics, at least as a branch of applied ethics, is unlikely to disappear in the future. In addition to challenges posed to Johnson s prediction by Gotterbarn and Marturano, others would also likely disagree with Johnson. For example, philosophers whose research interests in computer ethics focus mainly on issues of moral responsibility involving AI and robotics, as well as on issues concerned with whether we should allow computers

6 102 HERMAN T. TAVANI to make certain kinds of decisions (see, for example, Moor (1979), would also likely have a different view of the future of the field. It would certainly seem that AIrelated questions involving moral responsibility will continue to arise in the future and that these questions would, arguably, benefit from analysis by computer ethicists. For example, consider the kinds of roles electronic agents might play in decision making in the future, as more and more control is being transferred from humans to software agents. Eric Steinhart (1999) envisions a future scenario where automatons or self-directing software agents on the internet have control over an electric power grid and are responsible for deciding how to regulate the distribution of electricity throughout regions of a nation or how to route phone calls. As Steinhart correctly notes, certain moral issues clearly arise in this scenario. So it would seem that moral issues involving responsibility for decision making by electronic agents will be among the important issues that stand to benefit from careful analysis by philosophers in the future; and if this is true, it would seem that, despite Johnson s prediction, the field of computer ethics will not necessarily go away in the future. In speculating about the future of computer ethics and about which role(s) philosophers might have in the future, I believe that it would be helpful to take a brief look at some of the important phases of the development of computer technology during the last halfcentury to see how the evolution of that technology has raised certain ethical concerns for philosophers to consider. Note that in the following section, I do not attempt to give an accurate historical account of the development of the field of computer ethics. 13 Rather, I believe that a better understanding of how computer technology has evolved during the last fifty years can help us to understand more clearly some of the challenges we will likely face in the future when we reach a state of more complete technological convergence. Four phases of computing technology: The evolution from stand-alone mainframe computers to complete technological convergence In considering the impact that computing has had for ethics during the last half of the twentieth century, we could view it from the vantage point of four distinct stages or phases. In what we can call Phase 1 (1950s and 1960s), computing technology consisted mainly of huge mainframe computers, which were unconnected or stand-alone machines. The ethical implications of computing for ethical and social concerns at this phase can be seen in terms of questions that we 13 Again, I refer the reader to Bynum (1999, 2000) for an excellent account of the field s historical development. might today associate with AI. For example, should we invent thinking machines? And, if so what would be the impact for us as humans? Another concern during this phase was the fear associated with Big Brother, since a strong centralized government could collect significant amounts of information about its citizens and store that information indefinitely in the form of electronic records in large databases. In Phase 2 (1970s and 1980s), we begin to see the convergence of computing machines and communications devices, giving rise to an era of computer networks. In this phase, mainframes, minicomputers, microcomputers, and personal computers could all be linked together via privately owned computer networks in the form of local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks (WANs). Information could now be readily exchanged between databases, which were accessible to networked computers. Ethical issues that either arose or became exacerbated during this phase were in the areas of personal privacy (confidential records could be easily exchanged between databases), intellectual property (personal computers could be used to duplicate proprietary software programs), and computer crime (individuals could use remote terminals to break into and to disrupt computer systems). With Phase 3 (1990-present), the internet era, comes the greater availability of internet access to the general public and the development of the World Wide Web. The advent of internet technology raises, among other things, concerns related to free speech, anonymity, jurisdiction, trust, and so forth, that emerge during this phase of computing technology. Also of concern are questions about the public vs. private character of personal information that is easily available on the internet. At present, we are on the threshold of what could be called Phase 4, in which we are beginning to experience an unprecedented level of convergence of technologies. In one sense, we have already witnessed much technological convergence such as that which occurred at Phases 2 and 3. For example, at Phase 2 we saw the convergence of computing and communications devices, resulting in privately owned networked systems. And in Phase 3, the internet era, we saw the integration of text, video, and sound; and we also saw that computers had come to be viewed much more like a medium than a machine. But at Phase 3 the metaphor of, and interface to, computing technology is still much like that of previous phases (e.g., keyboard, screen, etc.) and computers are still viewed as something external to people, i.e., they are external devices with which humans interact. Now that computers are becoming ubiquitous and, to some extent, more and more a part of who we are as humans, we are perhaps

7 THE STATE OF COMPUTER ETHICS 103 on the cusp of a new, and arguably more significant, era of convergence. Deborah Hurley (2000) has recently presented us with a description of a world in which computing devices will soon be a part of our clothing, and even our bodies (e.g., bio-chip implants). In such an environment, computing devices may no longer be thought of as things or objects that are out there, or as devices that are external to humans. Indeed it may become difficult for us to separate out certain aspects of our biology from our technology in the future. Because of the situation I envision in Phase 4, it may seem that I am constructing a view that fits with Johnson s conception (described above), where computer ethics as a separate field of study will go away. On the contrary, I believe that, more than ever before, there will be a need both for a field of computer ethics 14 and for philosophers to do research in that field. Why should philosophers continue to do computer ethics? Before attempting to answer the question why exactly philosophers are needed to do computer ethics, it would be useful to draw an important distinction in Johnson s view about the future of the field. She makes two points that are worth considering separately: (i) computer ethics may disappear in the future, and (ii) computer ethics should disappear in the future. It is very difficult to refute (i) since only time will determine whether the field of computer ethics will flourish or even exist in the future. (In the preceding section I have tried to make a case for why computer ethics will not go away in the future.) However, we can debate the merits of (ii) now, and I will give some reasons for why computer ethics should not go away as a field of philosophical study. Not only have philosophers contributed by proposing solutions to ethical problems in computing by providing, where needed, new or revised moral theories (as we saw above in the case of theories offered by van den Hoven, Gert, Moor, and Adam), but philosophers have also contributed significantly to resolving much of the conceptual confusion that has arisen with respect to certain moral issues involving computing technology. In the future, technological issues will in all likelihood continue to strain and stretch ethical theory and continue to introduce conceptual muddles and confusions. Philosophers will be needed to help in both areas. 14 Of course, the title computer ethics itself may go away, but a separate field of applied philosophy devoted to ethical issues involving computing (in the broadest sense of computing ) will be needed in the future. We have already considered some of the ways that philosophers have responded to issues involving the need to reexamine and revise moral theory to address certain problems. Let us next examine some areas in which philosophers can help to clarify some existing and future conceptual confusions associated with moral issues in computing. Consider some of the confusion that currently exists with regard to exactly what is an ethical issue in computing. Birrer (1998) notes that it has become trendy to extend the term computer ethics to apply to almost anything that for decades used to be referred to by terms such as social issues in computing. Birrer goes on to point out that while many of the issues considered in this stretched sense of computer ethics may even be normative, they are not necessarily ethical in nature. Unfortunately, this important distinction is frequently glossed over, or in many cases overlooked altogether, in much of the computer ethics literature. 15 I have argued elsewhere (Tavani 1999b) that philosophers can play an important role in helping to sort out genuine ethical issues from those issues that are essentially sociological and descriptive in nature. If someone approaching the field of computer ethics for the first time were to examine much of the current literature that passes for computer ethics and Cyberethics, that person might get a very distorted picture of the field. For one thing, at least some of the books now being published with the expressions computer ethics or Cyberethics in their titles have little or nothing to do with ethics. For example, Willard s The Cyberethics Reader (1997), despite its title, does not address ethical issues at all. That particular text focuses primarily on scenarios having to do with polite behavior or etiquette on the internet (i.e., what some referred to as Netiquette ). Also, earlier books in the field, such as Forester and Morrison s Computer Ethics (1994), have had much more to do with cautionary tales and hypothetical scenarios involving social issues rather than with scenarios that are genuinely ethical in nature. Philosophers can also continue to help refine our understanding of many of the standard computer ethics issues, e.g., issues involving privacy, property, crime, an so forth as these concepts become stretched and strained by changing technological innovations. In an earlier section of this essay, I used an example of privacy on the internet to illustrate some confusions regarding whether there have been any new 15 It is perhaps worth noting that this phenomenon is not peculiar to computer ethics, since other areas of applied ethics, such as business ethics and environmental ethics, have also experienced the conflation of issues that are essentially sociological in nature with those that are genuinely ethical.

8 104 HERMAN T. TAVANI or unique ethical issues introduced by internet technology. Let us next consider a different computer ethics issue, viz., crime involving computer technology, to illustrate some ways in which philosophers can help us to eliminate certain conceptual confusions. Because of recent sensationalism surrounding certain crimes involving internet technology, 16 there has been a tendency on the part of many lawmakers to characterize crimes currently carried out on the internet as special kinds of crimes (e.g., Cybercrimes), merely because those crimes happen to involve the use or presence of internet technology. 17 Currently, there is no clear procedure for determining which criminal activities are genuine computer crimes or Cybercrimes and which are merely ordinary criminal acts that coincidentally involve computing technology. Confusion about which crimes should and should not be categorized (and possibly prosecuted) as computer crimes will likely become even more exacerbated as computing and communications devices continue to merge. Baase (1997) notes that a common crime involving cell phones has to do with cloning i.e., reprogramming one s cell phone to transmit another party s phone number so that the unsuspecting party would be billed for calls not made by that party. Should we classify this particular criminal act as a form of computer crime or Cybercrime on the grounds that digital technology was involved in the criminal act? What will happen when internet phones or I-phones, the complete merging of digital telephony with the internet, occurs? How will crimes involving such a merger of technologies be understood and prosecuted? I have argued elsewhere (Tavani 2000b) for the need for philosophers to help provide clearer and more coherent criteria for determining which crimes should and should not count as instances of Cybercrime. Of course, the same rationale involved in helping to elucidate confusions surrounding crimes involving computer technology in the future 16 For example, attacks on Web sites resulting in denial of services to users, the unleashing of the ILOVEYOU virus, and the challenge to the Napster Web site by the Recording Industry Association of America have caused significant media attention worldwide. 17 Contrast the crimes identified in the preceding footnote with criminal activities in which pedophiles use the Internet to lure young children, drug dealers use the the Internet to traffic drugs, and pornographers use the Internet to distribute child pornography. Should these crimes be categorized as Cybercrimes merely because Internet technology is involved. These three crimes, unlike the three mentioned in the preceding footnote, can also be committed without computing technology. Is that a relevant difference in determining which crimes should and should not be categorized as computer crimes or Cybercrimes? would hold for other issues in computer ethics as well. So it would seem that philosophers can help to elucidate many of the confusions that will result from the convergence of technologies in the future. Of course, some critics still might ask why philosophers should spend their time discussing and analyzing questions involving the future of computer technology. The answer to that question is perhaps best articulated by Moor (1998c) when he remarks: If philosophers do not confront the conceptual and ethical problems of the internet, who will? Following Moor s suggestion, we might ask who will help to clarify the conceptual confusions and solve the moral problems of the next era, i.e., the post-internet age, the era of technological convergence, or whatever that era will be called? Computer ethics resources Whereas the first two parts of this essay described some contemporary perspectives and future projections involving the field of computer ethics, this part identifies current resources available to philosophers and others who might be interested in learning more about the range of issues considered by computer ethicists. These resources are discussed in terms of three categories: conferences and associations, journals and periodicals, and textbooks and online teaching resources. Conferences and associations A number of international conferences and symposia, many of which are affiliated with and sponsored by one or more professional associations, will be of interest to philosophers eager to learn more about computer ethics. Several such conferences are held either annually or at regularly scheduled intervals as part of an ongoing series. Although there are now several conference series worthy of consideration, I believe that following six are of particular interest. Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) conferences are held at approximately 18-month intervals. CEPE 2000, the third conference in the series, recently took place at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, July 14 16, For more information about this conference, see: phil/events/cepe2000.html. Previous CEPE conferences, which have taken place at Erasmus University (The Netherlands) and the London School of Economics (UK), have been sponsored in cooperation with the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Group on Computers and Society (SIGCAS). Future CEPE conferences will be

9 THE STATE OF COMPUTER ETHICS 105 organized through a new computer ethics association, the International Society for Ethics and Information Technology (INSEIT). Computing and Philosophy (CAP) conferences, cosponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers, deal with all aspects of the computational turn that is occurring within the discipline of philosophy. Featured topics typically include AI and epistemology, new models of logic software, computer ethics, computing and world cultures, electronic resources, and the impact of distance learning on the profession of philosophy. In 2001, the CAP conference series expands to cover both the Eastern and Western sections of the US. CAP@OSU will be held at Oregon State University, January 18 20, 2001; and CAP@CMU will be held at Carnegie Mellon University, August 9 11, Future plans for CAP conferences include international venues. For more information about the two CAP 2001 conferences, see: ETHICOMP (International Conference on the Social and Ethical Impacts of Information and Communications Technologies) conferences are held at approximately 18-month intervals. ETHICOMP- 2001, the fifth conference in the series, is scheduled for June 2001 at the University of Gdansk, Poland. Ethicomp conferences, which have been held in England, Spain, The Netherands, and Italy, are now coordinated through the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility (De Montfort University, UK) and co-sponsored by the Research Center on Computing and Society (Southern Connecticut State University, CT, USA) For more information about ETHICOMP conferences and their sponsors, see: and computerethics.org. Ethics and Technology conferences, held annually, are sponsored by the philosophy, law, business, and computer science departments at three US institutions: Boston College, Loyola University Chicago, and Santa Clara University. The Sixth Annual Ethics and Technology Conference will take place at Santa Clara University, CA (USA) in the summer of For more information, see: ISTAS (International Symposium on Technology and Society) symposia, sponsored by the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) Society for Social Implications of Technology (SSIT), are held annually. ISTAS 2000, a recent symposium in the ISTAS series, took place in Rome, Italy (University La Sapienza ), September 6 8, For more information, see: Society for Philosophy and Technology (SPT) conferences, sponsored by the Society for Philosophy and Technology, are held every other year, rotating between North America and Europe. The conference series welcomes a broad range of papers from various philosophical perspectives and schools. The next SPT conference the 12th Biennial International Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, which was held at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland, July 9 11, 2001 focused on the growing set of epistemological, moral, social, political and conceptual problems related to 2001 conference theme: nature and technology. For more information, see: Journals and periodicals Although several journals and periodicals include articles on, and in some cases devote entire issues to, concerns associated with computer ethics, I believe that the publications described in this section are particularly useful. For a more extensive discussion of relevant journals and periodicals on or related to computer ethics, including a comparative review of three of the publications considered in this section, see Tavani (1997). Ethics and Information Technology (ISSN ) is a quarterly journal published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in the Netherlands. Now in its third year of publication, this peer-reviewed journal is dedicated to advancing the dialogue between moral philosophy and the field of information and communication technology (ICT). The journal frequently includes outstanding papers from conferences on or related to ethical issues in ICT, such as the CEPE, ETHICOMP, CAP, and SPT conferences. For more information, see: The Information Society: An International Journal (ISSN ) is a refereed quarterly journal published by Taylor and Francis. Currently in its twentieth year, the journal devotes special issues to themes on privacy, anonymity, electronic journals and scholarly publishing, and so forth. For more information, see: Journal of Information Ethics (ISSN ) is a refereed journal published twice a year (spring and fall) by McFarland and Company, Inc. Currently in its tenth year, the journal publishes papers on a range of topics in information ethics, including free speech and censorship, privacy and security, academic integrity and plagiarism on the Web, and so forth. The journal does not have a Web site; however interested readers can get more information by contacting the journal s editor, Robert Hauptman, at the following address: Learning Resources and Technology Services, 720 4th Ave. So., St. Cloud University, St. Cloud, MN USA.

10 106 HERMAN T. TAVANI Computers and Society (ISSN ), currently in its thirty-first year, is a quarterly periodical published by ACM-SIGCAS (see above for a description). Formerly a newsletter, this publication includes peer-reviewed articles as well as regular columns and departments, some of which feature short pieces on teaching computer ethics. Computers and society also devotes specials issues to selected papers from the CEPE, ACM Policy, and ACM Computers and Quality of Life (CQL) conferences and symposia. For more information, see: edu/ sigcas/ and IEEE Technology and Society Magazine (ISSN ) is a quarterly periodical published by IEEE-SSIT (see above for a description). Currently in its twentieth year of publication, this periodical contains peer-reviewed papers on a range of social and ethical issues involving computer and non-computer technologies. Each year, it includes a special issue devoted to outstanding papers from the ISTAS symposium series. For more information, see: CPSR Newsletter, published quarterly by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (Palo Alto, CA USA), is currently in its nineteenth year. The periodical is now published in electronic form only (see although printed copies can also be requested from CPSR. Each issue is guest edited by CPSR members, and recent special issues have included themes such as ethics (Spring 2000) and gender and technology (Winter 2000). For more information, see: APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers (ISSN: ) is published twice a year spring and fall by the American Philosophical Association ( The periodical includes articles and columns that cover a range of issues associated with the computational turn in philosophy, including topics in AI, logic, and computer ethics. Also included are regular columns on Teaching in cyberspace, Web site searches, and E-Journal reviews. For more information, contact Jon Dorbolo at: Jon.Dorbolo@orst.edu. Techne: Society for Philosophy and Technology Quarterly Electronic Journal, now in its sixth year, is published quarterly by the Society for Philosophy and Technology. A peer-reviewed electronic journal, the periodical evolved from the annual book series Philosophy and technology (Kluwer Academic Publishers). A wide range of issues in philosophy ant technology are covered in the papers in this journal. Some journal issue are dedicated to papers selected from the biennial SPT conferences. For more information, see: Most of the above journals and periodicals regularly include reviews of recent books on or related to computer ethics. Each includes relevant information and news items about its affiliated professional association, as well as announcements of upcoming computer ethics conferences and events. Two additional periodicals each published monthly, one by by ACM and the other by IEEE that will be of interest to some are Communications of the ACM and IEEE Computer. Textbooks and online teaching resources There are several second-generation computer ethics textbooks available to those interested in teaching a course or course component on computer ethics. Although instructors can now choose from a wide range of computer ethics textbooks, many of which are also authored by non-philosophers (e.g., computer scientists and social scientists), philosophers will likely find the third edition of Deborah Johnson s Computer Ethics (Prentice-Hall, 2001) and Richard Spinello s CyberEthics: Morality and Law in Cyberspace (Jones and Bartlett Publishers 2000) to be at the top of their list. A reader that works very well with Johnson s textbook is Computing, ethics and social values (Prentice-Hall, 1995), edited by Johnson and Helen Nissenbaum; and a reader that complements Spinello s textbook is Spinello and Tavani s Readings in Cyberethics (Jones and Bartlett 2001). Philosophers interested in specific ethical issues involving artificial intelligence and virtual reality should find Stacey Edgar s Morality and Machines (Jones and Bartlett 1997) useful. A recently published reader that complements certain sections of Edgar s book, especially the chapters on AI and VR, is Hester and Ford s Computers and Ethics in the Cyberage (Prentice- Hall, 2001). For more information about several of the computer ethics textbooks that are also currently available, see Tavani (1999b). A growing number of online resources are available to instructors interested in developing or revising a course in computer ethics. Whereas some Web sites contain materials useful for preparing a course syllabus, others include information that can aid students and instructors in certain computer ethics research projects. Fortunately, the URLs for many of these individual sites have been incorporated into two well-designed Web sites, each developed and maintained by Tom Jewett. One site includes links to online course syllabi ( sigcas/courses.asp), and the other includes links to instructional resources ( sigcas/resources.asp). The first site identifies and provides direct links to more than fifty course