AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGIES CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE COMBAT AIR SYSTEMS

Transcription

1 AEROSPACE TECHNOLOGIES CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE COMBAT AIR SYSTEMS Dr. Armand J. Chaput Senior Technical Fellow Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company Fort Worth, Texas USA Phone: Fax: Abstract The year 2007 finds the international aerospace industry growing and healthy. Markets are strong and teams around the world are looking forward to development of the next generation of aerospace products. Particular attention is paid to aerospace technology advancements the engine of change that has allowed each generation of aerospace product to outperform its predecessors. Although these technologies have been key contributors to aerospace success to date, they are not necessarily the future enablers. Even today, aerospace products achieve superb performance through superb integration the engineering of the individual system elements so that the overall system performs at or near optimum levels. Even though the importance of integration is widely acknowledged in government and industry, few graduating engineers are knowledgeable of the concept, much less the tools and methods involved. This paper provides a perspective on integration as an enabling technology and questions where the new integration engineers and technologists and will come from. Background Over a period of 20-plus years, this author has published and/or presented a number of papers on the subject of future design and technology challenges for advanced aerospace products, and it is a pleasure to add one more to the list for Aero India 2007 (Figure 1). In general, the projections have been reasonably correct, although none were perfect. However, the significance of these projections is not in the details of which projections came true precisely, which got close, and which missed the mark. Rather, the significance was in the evolution of the projection themes, starting with a nextgeneration fighter, then an unmanned tactical aircraft, and finally an unmanned combat air system. Equally significant was the evolution of the forums at which they were presented. The first was an aircraft design conference; the second was a conference on mission systems; and the third was a conference on system concepts and integration. Taken together, the titles and forums show an inexorable trend from considerations for an individual combat aircraft type (e.g., a fighter) to considerations for an overall aircraft system and/or systems. Figure 1 Evolution of Projections From Aircraft to Systems 1

2 Today s paper will address the challenges and opportunities for combat aircraft systems where the importance of systems and system integration is well established (Figure 2). It will, however, take an even broader view and address not just aerospace design and technology considerations, but the source of these technologies (and technologists). Often we don t think much about the source of our technologies and, for that matter, our technologists. We assume they will be there when we need them. The validity of this assumption may be one of the critical issues facing our industry. We are becoming increasingly reliant on the integrated contributions of multiple technologies across multiple disciplines to achieve our system-performance goals. It is not clear that we are adequately providing an understanding of the fundamental issues associated with multitechnology integration to the next generation of engineers and technologists, much less preparing them to advance the state of the art. Part Systems Engineering A process used to design and develop well-integrated systems Most Systems Engineers are process not system focused Part Design Engineering Technical knowledge and skill in design and development of well-integrated systems Part Tools and Methods Technical knowledge and skill in development and application of integration methods Figure 2 Integration What Is It? Aerospace Technologies: Roles and Responsibilities Over the years, academia, government 1 and industry have evolved a beneficial and shared responsibility for technology (and technologist) development. The roles played by each of the three have evolved with time, but are driven by institutional motivations, objectives and capabilities, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 Technology Pursuit Rationale and Capabilities Academia, for example, is where students receive a solid understanding of engineering fundamentals, albeit in specific technology areas, and is the primary source of fundamental research. There are many reasons: academic institutions are about education and the advancement of knowledge; the 1 In this discussion, the generic term government will be used to describe national defense and related civilian organizations. Other synonymous terms used will be customer and user. 2

3 academic environment is less constrained by schedule than government and industry; students and professors are motivated to dig deep into their subject areas; and, of course, there is a major emphasis on publication. As a result, industry and government generally operate on the assumption that academic institutions will work the fundamentals and, to date, those academic fundamentals of interest have been in individual technology areas. Although industry and government are also in the education business, albeit focused primarily on training, their primary contributions to technology/technologist development are resources, facilities and program support (government) and end-product applications (industry). Both also provide rewarding careers and jobs for engineers and technologists who seek opportunities outside of academia. This defined split in roles and responsibilities may surprise some in academia who also see the aerospace industry as a source of technology funding and research program support. Although it certainly does occur, most often it is in response to a knowledge or methodology shortfall in a specific area and not an across-the-board commitment to support university research. Otherwise the aerospace industry, at least in the United States, has become notoriously tight-fisted when it comes to supporting university research. This is a change that occurred during my career and, from an industry perspective, there are many reasons for it including; technology transfer restrictions, policies on intellectual property, changes in government research and development reimbursement criteria, etc. Nonetheless, one contributor has been reduced industry interest in the scope and direction of university aerospace research. Generally it is seen as not being as relevant to industry as it once was. Design and Technology Considerations for Future Combat Air Systems In 1983 as the newly installed manager of Advanced Design at then-general Dynamics (GD) Fort Worth Division and a member of the Aircraft Design Technical Committee of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), I was asked to present a paper on future fighter design and technology requirements. The result was the first paper which reached, from my perspective as a long-term aerospace technology advocate, an unexpected conclusion (Figure 4). Figure 4 Fighter Performance Takes On a New Meaning Traditional aerospace technologies were projected to continue to advance, but the real advancements in fighter capability for the next two decades would come from avionics. And over the longer term, after the explosive growth in avionics capability leveled off, continuing capability improvements would come from hybrid technologies, a term GD used to describe what we now call integrated 3

4 technologies. Integrated technologies came in suites and included various combinations of aerodynamics, flight controls, structure, propulsion, weapons integration, avionics and human factors or pilot-vehicle interface technologies. In fact, this was part of GD s long-term technology development plan which included the Advanced Fighter Technology Integration (AFTI) F-16 sponsored by the U.S. Air Force. The AFTI F-16 was truly an integrated platform flight controls, sensors, mission systems and the pilot were highly integrated, and it served as a technology test bed for follow-on versions of the F-16. Other technology integration demonstrators followed including the F-16 Axi-symmetric Thrust Vectoring Nozzle program which added integrated flight-propulsion control to the suite of demonstrated technologies. GD was not alone in the pursuit of integrated technology advancement; McDonnell-Douglas received the coveted U.S. Air Force contract for the F- 15 Short Takeoff and Landing/Maneuver (STOL/M) demonstrator, while North American Rockwell and Deutsche Aerospace teamed for the U.S. Air Force/National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)-sponsored X-31 Enhanced Fighter Maneuverability (EFM) demonstrator. Although not all of the integrated technologies demonstrated in these programs transitioned to the next-generation fighters, the activity clearly put the world of aerospace on notice that future fighter aircraft technologies would be highly integrated. The future trend was clear, next generation aerospace system capability growth would involve integrated technology development. Design Considerations for Future Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles Approximately 15 years after the first paper, a second one was published on the subject of unmanned fighter aircraft 2. This was a more complicated and controversial subject than manned fighter technology projection because it was not clear what missions would be required of these aircraft. Therefore, the paper provided an assessment of combat air needs vs. the capabilities of a range of potential system solutions (Figure 5). The paper concluded that unmanned aircraft would not be onefor-one replacements for manned aircraft or cruise missiles but rather would evolve into unique systems that capitalized on their strengths (e.g., unencumbered by human limitations or crew loss considerations, the potential for significantly lower operations and support costs), while avoiding their weaknesses (e.g., limited operator situation awareness, susceptibility to jamming, limitations in communications bandwidth, limited onboard intelligence). The least-complicated (e.g., fixed-target attack), most endurance-dependent (e.g., loiter or combat air patrol) and most dangerous (e.g., suppression of enemy air defenses) missions were projected to go unmanned first and followed later by other dull-dirty-dangerous missions as system capabilities improved. The paper, however, noted that before the most obvious missions could be assigned to unmanned systems, significant improvements were needed in system reliability (especially for communications and air vehicles) and the ability of unmanned systems to interoperate with manned aircraft in national airspace. 2 Originally known as Unmanned Tactical Aircraft (UTA), the concept was renamed Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) to convey that it was not just an unmanned tactical fighter but an air vehicle system. The term uninhabited was used to convey that human operators were in control of the system; they were simply not collocated with the air vehicle. Later the name was further broadened to Unmanned Combat Air System (UCAS) to emphasize that these were not just air vehicles but rather a system of air vehicles. 4

5 Figure 5 Roles and Missions Projection Based on System Strengths and Weaknesses From the perspective of today s paper, perhaps the most significant outcome was the basis for the projections system-level simulations that led to quantification of the performance benefits and limitations vs. qualitative opinions and assertions. In fact, without access to man-in-the-loop systemlevel simulation, the results of the paper would have had little or no substantive basis. Without a fundamental understanding of the limits and capabilities of overall systems, projections of strengths and weaknesses have little technical basis. Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle Concepts for Combat Air Support The final paper in the series proposed a revolutionary system concept an integrated network of air vehicle systems intended to respond directly to requests/commands from individual combatants (Figure 5). The performance and capabilities of any of the individual systems were much less important than the capability of the overall system to respond. For example, instead of going through the traditional process of racking and stacking of requests for intelligence or combat air support, the system architecture would be designed to respond to individual requests for air support based on capability to respond. In many respects, it was the military equivalent of a civilian taxi dispatch or pizza delivery service. The interesting aspect of this was that the concept required no, repeat no individual technology developments to achieve its revolutionary goals (Figure 6). Despite the absence of requirements for individual technology advancements, achievement of the overall system capability goals required extremely sophisticated concepts of operation (i.e., system integration). This is perhaps the epitome of a technologist s nightmare, revolutionary new system, no technology required. From a technology integration standpoint, however, it is the ultimate challenge. 5

6 Figure 6 Revolutionary New Combat Air System Concept No New Technology Required Challenges and Opportunities for Future Combat Air Systems From the perspective of 20+ relatively short years involvement in trying to project future aerospace challenges and opportunities, the message is clear one of the critical future aerospace challenges is technology integration (Figure 6). It may or may not involve new technology but, nonetheless, it is a challenge. Given that observation, how does this fit with the traditional model of technology roles and responsibilities? What role should academia play from an educational and fundamental research perspective? And what about government? Or does this one fall entirely on industry to handle? The answer depends partly on whether the challenge is perceived as a straightforward technical task or a substantive, long-term technology challenge. Technology Integration Task or Technology? A task is something accomplished using established tools or principles. Solution methods are defined, and qualified people are available to teach the process and/or review the results. By this definition, most aerospace challenges clearly are not technology (i.e., research) challenges. For example, design of a structural airframe component using known materials and well-understood loads may be an engineering challenge but not a technology challenge. On the other hand, design of the same component using a new material and/or manufacturing process could legitimately be considered a technology challenge, at least for a period of time. Once the challenge was resolved, it would be relegated to task status. Although a government research organization might launch a research program around the new material or manufacturing process to reduce the risk, a university would be ill-advised to establish a new course of study around something so short-lived. Using the above criteria, technology integration could be either a task or a technology. For example, integrating a straightforward new airfoil with a new wing structural design might be challenging, but it probably is not a technology challenge. Integrated aerodynamic and structural wing design methods are well-established and, if there is little about the new application that stresses existing methods or 6

7 knowledge, it is simply a task. However, if the airfoil has to morph in flight and the structure deform beyond previously established limits, it assuredly would be considered a technology challenge. However, the challenge might not be sufficiently long-lived to justify university pursuit much beyond submitting a proposal to support a graduate student thesis or dissertation (i.e., a technology project). In conclusion, logic suggests that the criteria for determining whether something is a task, a technology project or a technology area involve: (1) existence of established methods, (2) degree of current knowledge and (3) longevity. By extension of the previous logic, technology integration is clearly a technology (Figure 7). The subject is not well understood; the methods are not well developed; and the risk level of making a bad technology integration decision is high. The only remaining question is whether technology integration research should be pursued as a project or a long-term technology area. The simple fact that technology integration has been a challenge for the last 25 years and is unlikely to go away for another 25 years (if ever), provides the answer it is, or should be, a technology pursuit area across academia-government-industry. But the fact of the matter is it isn t. Status of Integration Education Integration Technology Advancements in state of the art New Concepts of Integration Advancements in Integration Tools and Methods Do the job accurately and efficiently Figure 7 The Technology of Technology Integration For reasons that could be the subject of another paper, few universities have courses of instruction on integration, technology or otherwise. Integration is viewed as a variation of design which, in the United States, is taught at the undergraduate level, but usually not considered a proper subject for scholarly pursuit at the graduate level. However, in both industry and government, people with good integration skills are highly valued, and they often move to the top of the organization and assume titles like chief engineer (Figure 8). They are, in fact, the engineering counterparts of CEOs, the career objective of thousands of graduate students in hundreds of Master of business administration (MBA) programs around the world. A question to ponder if studies toward an MBA are considered scholarly pursuit, why aren t studies towards the engineering equivalent equally scholarly? Possess Multidiscipline Skills (not just familiarity) Able to do run their own numbers in multiple areas Able to separate hope/hype from fact Overall System Knowledge Solid technical understanding of the overall product, its parts and interactions Dirt under the fingernails Up-to-date on tools and methods Disciplined and Organized Technically rigorous including follow-up Solid planning and organization capabilities Excellent Interpersonal Skills Able to deal effectively with large groups and egos Focused and Decisive Able to lead teams through complicated and/or contentious technical decisions Figure 8 Characteristics of a Successful Technology Integrator 7

8 Current Status of Integration Technology and Research For reasons similar to those discussed above, few universities consider technology integration as a research area. Among universities that do recognize it as a legitimate area for research, the tendency is to focus on convergence and/or visualization methods vs. the fundamentals of air system technology integration. The situation is not much different in government except that the focus is on system-level and mission area simulation methods. On the industrial side, my observation is that many companies view technology integration as a task to be accomplished on a program-by-program basis. Functional areas of responsibility are blurred, and little or no work is done to build basic technical capabilities across programs. This leads to an interesting dichotomy: technology integration as a skill is highly valued the future of aerospace depends on it but few teach it or conduct research on how to do it better. Concluding Remarks Industry, government and academia share responsibility for the development of technology and technologists across a range of technical disciplines. The future of aerospace products depends on technology integration for continued overall system capability growth, especially integration of multiple vs. single discipline technologies. Technology integration involves much more than application of a systems engineering process, and our ability to continue to advance aerospace state of the art requires: (1) integrators with substantive knowledge across multiple technical areas and (2) improved tools and methods for overall system integration. Industry, government and university need to assess their readiness to support development of future systems that are even more dependent on highly-integrated technologies. 8