Ziemke, Tom. (2003). What s that Thing Called Embodiment?

Transcription

1 Ziemke, Tom. (2003). What s that Thing Called Embodiment? Aleš Oblak MEi: CogSci, 2017

2 Before After Carravagio (1602 CE). San Matteo e l angelo Myron ( BCE). Discobolus

3 Six Views of Embodied Cognition I. Cognition is situated; II. Cognition is time-pressured; III. Cognitive work is off-loaded into the environment IV. The environment is part of the cog. system V. Cognition is for action; VI. Off-line cognition is body-based. Rembrandt, H. R. (1659) Mozes en de tafelen der wet

4 Working definition of embodiment Embodiment: a term used to refer to the fact that intelligence cannot merely exist in the form of an abstract algorithm, but requires a physical instantiation, a body. Pfeifer & Scheier (1999) Kuniyoshi, U. (1838). Saito Oniwakamaru Chase, W. M. (1905). Still Life with Fish

5 I. Embodiment as structural coupling A system X is embodied in an environment E if perturbatory channels exist between the two. That means, X is embodied in E if for every time t at which both X and E exist, some subset of E s possible states with respect to X have the capacity to perturb X s state, and some subset of X s possible states with respect to E have the capacity to perturb E s state. Quick (1999) X E

6 2 E E X E E E Friedrich, C. D. (1824) Das Eismeer

7 II. Historical embodiment Embodied systems are not only coupled with their environments in the present, but we can see a history of agent-environment coupling.

8 Several K years Friedrich, C. D. (1824) Felsenriff am Meeresstrand

9 III. Physical embodiment Embodiment = possessing a physical body - Software NO; - Granite outcrops, glaciers, reefs YES. Village Roadshow Pictures (2003) The Matrix Revolutions Bernini, G. L. (1622) Ratto di Proserpina

10 III.a) Physical grounding The agent is not connected to the environment only by physical forces, but by sensors and motors as well. Sensorimotor embodiment??? Walt Disney Pictures (2008). WALL-E

11 A tangent: Ziemke (1999) Rethinking Grounding The grounding problem is / / the problem of how to causally connect an artificial agent with its environment, such that agent s [behavior], as well as the mechanisms, representations, etc. underlying it, can be intrinsic and meaningful to itself. (ibid.) Agent-environment interaction; Causal connection between the agent and the environment.

12 Tangent continues Two approaches to reaching grounding: I. Cognitivist (disembodied view of the mind); Input systems and central systems; Percept Representation; Atomic representations Complex representations; II. Enactivist (embodiment, action, agent-environment coupling); Physical grounding

13 III.a) Physical grounding Agents are embodied and situated; Situatedness refers to the agents operating here and now, not with abstract representations; Grounded behavior emerges from parallel action of behavioral subsystems, rather than a central processor; The idea of rooting: systems are rooted if they as a whole develop in interaction with their environment; Natural embodiment: physical embodiment + structural coupling + mutual specification between agent and environment;

14 IV. Organismoid embodiment Organism-like cognition requires organism-like bodies; Wilson s IV claim on embodiment: off-line cognition is body-based; Sensorimotor structures. Meaningful conceptual structures arise from two sources: (1) from the structured nature of bodily and social experience and (2) from our innate capacity to imaginatively project from certain well-structured aspects of bodily and interactional experience to abstract conceptual structures. Lakoff (1998)

15 The Khepra robot (Lund, Webb & Hallam, 1998) Witney & Hedwig (2011). Kinematics of phonotactic steering in the walking cricket

16 Cog (Brooks et al, 1998) - Gain intelligence by learning; - Learns by watching; - Socially appropriate behavior; MIT AI Laboratories (1998) Rodney Brooks and Cog

17 V. Organismic embodiment Cognition is not limitted to organism-like bodies, but to organisms, to living bodies. A Varelian view of cognition is that cognition is what living systems do in interaction with their environments.

18 Biology of cognition According to Varela & Maturana (1980) living organisms are autopoietic and autonomous; Man-made machines are heteronomous and allopoietic; Machines according to plans, whereas living organisms are acting plans. Ziemke ( )

19 Entropy According to Kordeš (2004) cognition Allows organisms to minimize their Internal entropy; Free-energy Principle; The purpose of cognition is to Create a stable reality. Friedrich, C. D. (1818) Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer

20 Von Uexküll (1928) Behavior of organisms is context-dependent and grows from experience; In his time machines were not able of growth; Machines constructed centripetally; Organisms construct themselves centrifugally;

21 VI. Social embodiment states of the body, such as postures, arm movements, and facial expressions, arise during social interaction and play central roles in social information processing. Barsalou et al (in press) Social stimuli produce both cognitive and bodily states; Creates knowledge required to navigate social situations; Partial simulation of sensory, motor and introspective states.

22 Social embeddedness (Dautenhahn et al, 2001) Socially embedded agents are coupled with their social environment; Coupling = being interaction-aware; E E X Trumbull, J. (1817). Declaration of Independence

23 Social interaction (partial) awareness of social interactions; Not necessarily an explicit representation of social structure (ants); Perceiving and reacting to dynamically-occuring interactive cues; Anthropomorphic or zoomorphic shape; Ability to track, identify, and interpret visual interactive behavior; Continuum of formality; Globally VS locally structured interactions;

24 Summary 1. Structural coupling; 2. Historical embodiment; 3. Physical embodiment Physical groundedness; 4. Organismoid embodiment; 5. Organismic embodiment; 6. Social embodiment social embeddedness

25 Thank you for your attention!

26 Primary sources Dautenhahn, K., Ogden, B., Quick, T. (2001). From embodied to socially embedded agents Implications for interaction-aware robots. Cognitive Systems Researc. 3(1): Kordeš, U. (2004). Od resnice k zaupanju. Studia humanitatis: Ljubljana Ziemke, T. (1999). Rethinking Grounding. Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences. Plenum Press: New York, Ziemke, T. ( ). What s that Thing Called Embodiment. Proc. of the 25th Annual Conf. of the Cog. Sci. Society,